Not every analyst or red teamer is spontaneously creative. For those who occasionally struggle to generate new ideas, Zwicky’s morphological box can help. Even analysts who fancy themselves to be wildly inventive can benefit from the approach. [click to continue ...]
From the monthly archives:
September 2008
The current banking crisis has drawn attention to the long-term financial health of the United States. When positing future scenarios and strategies, analysts and red teamers will be negligent if they overlook the unfavorable budget trends David Walker and his colleagues outline on the Peter G. Peterson Foundation site. At the very least, strategic red teamers should consider the following four implications of the massive federal burden: [click to continue ...]
Red Team Journal is pleased to welcome Dr. Robert J. Bunker to the RTJ advisory board. Dr. Bunker is CEO of the Counter-OPFOR Corporation, a security consulting company focusing on strategies to mitigate and respond to threats posed by non-state opposing forces (OPFORs). Dr. Bunker served as 2006-2007 Futurist in Residence (FIR), FBI Academy, Quantico, VA., and was a founding member of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group. He is a former consultant to the National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center (NLECTC) West; past Fellow, Institute of Land Warfare (ILW), Association of the US Army; and former Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program, California State University San Bernardino. His publications include the edited works Non-State Threats and Future Wars; Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency; and Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers. He can be reached at pradatorius at counter-OPFOR dot com.
I originally posted this assessment on Red Team Journal in January 2003, just prior to the invasion of Iraq. I’m re-posting it now because the invasion remains an open issue, one whose effects are certain to ripple outward politically, militarily, and diplomatically for years to come. I am, of course, pleased that the administration and the Pentagon revisited their Iraq strategy and that violence in Iraq has declined.1 That said, we have no guarantees, particularly in a world that looks very different than it did in 2003 and will no doubt look even more different in 2013. [click to continue ...]
Notes:
This article from Sept. 2004 is one of the most requested method papers from the previous iteration of Red Team Journal. Although many of my ideas have matured in the past four years, I believe the paper remains valuable, if only as a point of departure for further discussion. I also still recommend Russo and Schoemaker’s work, from which I drew some key concepts. [click to continue ...]
