I’m finally getting around to reading Wired’s May 2009 story on Marc Weber Tobias, “The Ultimate Lock Picker Hacks Pentagon, Beats Corporate Security for Fun and Profit.” Many of you have probably read it already, but it raises a host of interesting questions. For example, when should a vulnerability be publicized? (For completists, Wired ran another story on Tobias in February 2005: “The Lock Busters.”)
From the monthly archives:
July 2009
Many barriers to good decisions exist. Sometimes the barrier’s an inherent, individual bias; sometimes it’s a group pathology; sometimes it’s the complexity of the situation or the subtlety of the opponent’s deception plan; and sometimes it’s a combination of many factors. Regardless, it appears to be relatively easy to identify the factors that lead to poor decisions. Cognitive scientists, psychologists, and intelligence analysts are all familiar with the canonical lists of these biases and factors. Less common are lists of factors that contribute to good decisions. Is it simply because we can characterize these latter factors as simply the lack of the former, or is there something more that contributes to success? If so, what are the factors that characterize successful decisions? Similarly, what factors characterize successful red teaming?
At the heart of the future forces debate are three basic questions: (1) what kind of training and force structure should we employ to fight future conflicts? (2) What kind of wars should we fight? (3) Are today’s conflicts the wars of the future or aberrations? However, these are derived from only one vision of the future–”failing states” hypothesis of weak and/or collapsing states plagued by resource wars. While this vision of the future may be correct, the inability to think about other state change variables is demonstrative of a failure of imagination. Strategic discourse also largely fails to contextualize current forces debates within greater American grand strategy. [click to continue ...]
Charles Martel writes in to challenge what he views as the hegemonic interpretation of the Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame:
The key to Red Teaming is to ascertain and draw conclusions based on the facts and not just conventional wisdom. …[Van Riper's] actions during the experiment pointed out flaws in the implementation of some of the concepts under study. Those failures were documented then the experiment continued. van Riper was upset that the experiment wasn’t halted in the middle since ‘he had won.’ The leadership at the time felt it was better to reset the conditions and see how the concepts could be applied after the bluefor had learned a hard lesson. As a result of the experiment, some of the experimental concepts were canned, others modified. Seemed like exactly what an experiment is supposed to do.”
As perhaps the most controversial wargame of recent times, MC2002 undoubtedly provokes strong discussion. So I’ll open this up to RTJ readers: is the current interpretation of MC2002 wrongheaded? Has the process of mythmaking clouded accurate analysis? Does MC2002 have relevance to greater US defense policy and strategy, or is it a relic of the Rumsfeld age? Lastly, did MC2002 pose a fatal blow to some Transformation concepts or simply indicate correctable flaws? We would especially like to hear from those involved in the exercise.
To add to Tim’s excellent rundown of failures in red teaming, another pressing issue is the fact that red teaming that demonstrates weaknesses in operational and strategic concepts is not always accepted by policy-makers. Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper’s performance during the Millennium Challenge 2002 exercises is often cited as a paramount example of red teaming results being ignored by policymakers. Riper used asymmetric tactics to stymie a numerically superior force equipped with top of the line command and control systems, thus demonstrating the weaknesses of many of the military concepts that come to prominence during the late 90′s and early 2000s.
Central to Brigadier General H.R. McMaster’s Vietnam-era civil-military study Dereliction of Duty (as well as many critical military histories of Vietnam) are the SIGMA series wagames, which predicted numerous problems in the Johnson administration’s Vietnam strategy. In one 1963 game, the end result was 500,000 troops deployed to the country and draft riots at home. Other games suggested that strategic bombing and the deployment of large-scale forces in the South would not compel North Vietnam to back down. Furthermore, participants noted that while BLUE Force had an overwhelmingly short-run and tactical focus while RED focused on long term and strategic objectives–putting less stock in short-term tactical victories.
What both examples demonstrate is that the success or failure of red teaming exercises is dependent on the policy process. Much is dependent on how the lessons of the red team are received, interpreted, and integrated into tactical, operational, or strategic planning.
Earlier this month, The National Security Archive at The George Washington University declassified the briefings conducted between Saddam Hussein and the FBI. During these briefings, Saddam stalwartly defended himself against accusations (1) that he had aligned himself with Al-Qaeda and (2) that Iraq had WMD capabilities–the two main reasons given by the Bush administration for the Iraq invasion. Saddam states that any talk of WMDs was, in fact, a bluff directed at Iran so that Iraq would not appear weak. If what Saddam told his interrogators was not deception used by a captured man seeking to cover up the truth, his statements point to a red team debacle by U.S. intelligence agencies. [click to continue ...]
PowerPoint, a brand of presentation software attached to the Microsoft Office suite, is endemic to bureaucracies across America. Members of corporations, law enforcement agencies, government organizations, and the armed forces have all briefed using PowerPoint or sat through presentations. Most PowerPoint presentations are completely artless endeavors, with presenters reading off slides packed either with half-baked bullet point outlines or whole paragraphs. [click to continue ...]
Red Team Journal readers may be interested in the latest call for papers (PDF) at the Journal of Strategic Security. The topic is insurgency and terrorism, and the deadline for submissions is 31 August 2009. The journal is seeking insights and ideas of the sort red teamers generate. As they note in the call, “your creativity and unique perspective are welcome.”
Alex Soojung-Kim Pang of Relevant History has an interesting think piece about futurism gone awry, arguing that the discipline suffers because it is so easy to be a huckster. “Evil futurists” intimately know how to exploit the human psyche in order to market ambitious (and fallacious) “big think” ideas:
“One simple idea may be one too many. The future is complex, but you shouldn’t be. Philip Tetlock explained in Expert Political Judgment that there are two kinds of forecasting personalities: foxes, who tend to appreciate contingency and don’t make big claims, and hedgehogs, who have a hammer and see the whole world as a giant nail. Guess who wins. Having a single big theory, even if it’s totally outrageous, makes you sound more credible. Having a Great Idea also makes it easier for you to seem like a Great Visionary, capable of seeing things that others cannot.”
In the past few months, I have built and refined an approach to analysis I have dubbed reciprocal net assessment (RNA). It is based on principles inherent in hypergame analysis and is designed to encourage analysts and decision makers to avoid decision breakdowns and create and exploit decision opportunities. Although I am still refining the approach, I now believe it is ready for testing. I am currently offering pro bono analysis of two cases: one military- or security-related and the other business-related. If you might be interested in submitting a case for consideration, read on. [click to continue ...]
