A New Approach to Mass Space

Forget About Intelligence-Based Threat Assessments

The report of the UK Intelligence and Security Committee on the 2005 London Underground attacks emphasized the problematic nature of intelligence-based threat assessments, where information underpinning the assessment is incomplete or confusing.⁷ Famously, this very issue was emphasized by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller and subsequently endorsed by the UK Intelligence and Security Committee⁸ and shows that one of the central dilemmas of countering terrorism is that intelligence requiring interpretation and assessment is patchy, fragmentary, and uncertain.⁹       Foregoing use of an intelligence based threat assessment (given the vast array of possible vulnerabilities that can be identified in any given complex space) makes developing vulnerability analysis highly problematic. Compounding this foundational challenge is the basic uncertainty noted in the FEMA 426 Reference Manual: “It is difficult to predict how, why, and when terrorists may attack.”¹⁰       The FEMA vulnerability analysis approach emphasizes the difficulties of identifying threats, as any weakness can be exploited by an aggressor to make an asset susceptible to damage. Many kinds of vulnerabilities can be exploited in most circumstances. The fact that any possibility needs to be considered is automatically problematic for developing an analysis of vulnerabilities in complex spaces. This is because only a few are realistically identified and successfully mitigated. However, in circumstances where there is no intelligence-based threat assessment, the default has to be a vulnerability assessment. This typically includes the following: a study of the types of potential adversaries and their tactics, potential actions, motivations, and capabilities. In the case of identifying threats to a building or facility, the analyst identifies the threats that are common, and usually the threat analysis involves a systematic review of the type of incidents that have occurred not only in the past but also a review what is happening today and what might be expected in the future.       Alternative methodologies are also available for vulnerability analysis that do not rely on an intelligence-based threat assessment.¹¹ Critically, these tend to emphasize consequence aspects of system failure. In practice, data about consequences is drawn from a wider examination of the building or space, such as, for example, the building vulnerability assessment checklist found in chapter 1.6 of the FEMA 426 manual.¹²       Briefly, the usual approach for undertaking vulnerability analysis is to form a multidisciplinary team consisting of service and structural engineers (to identify structural response and consequence issues), security practitioners, and blast analysts¹³ The group works within a framework, where typical attacks have been identified using military-styled tactical analysis, informed with engineering knowledge about the building and area site. This gives an operational concept, and the group explores–from an assailant’s view–what needs to be undertaken in order for the attack on the building or space to be successful. This in turn leads to a review of the tactical situation in which the building or site is located. The critical view taken in this paper is that the starting point for analysis should be 3D-based tactical analysis, as this feeds into tactical and operational thinking.

3D Tactical Analysis

Blackwell argues currently “most security models are only suitable for limited problem domains, and are incomplete, as they do not consider all the ways security issues can arise.”¹⁴ In preceding decades, professional focus on risk management degraded or resulted in lost skills in vulnerability analysis. Additionally, security professionals have failed to develop and translate a tactical approach, which is military in origin, into the civilian security world, which from an organizational and cultural perspective, many find it difficult to use.       Compounding the problem has been the lack of an effective language to communicate analysis of tactical situations in complex environments such as mass gathering places. As well, at a professional level, vulnerability analysis methodology is driven by engineering risk auditing, which lacks a well-developed system for tactical appreciations. Often security thinking relies on the individual skill levels of practitioners to develop the analysis, without an objective standard in place to baseline conclusions.       The crime science community has attempted to plug the gap by introducing a process for collecting essential information on the situational vulnerabilities of a site, facility, or building related to a broad range of non-specific criminal and terrorist threats.¹⁵ Ronald Clarke and Graeme Newman call this approach situational terrorism prevention theory (STPT).       The reason for adopting this approach is a greater focus on the consequence side of risk auditing, which is currently lacking in security risk analysis. STPT can be condensed to the formula that “leaving opportunities open for attack ‘invites’ attack.”¹⁶ Clarke and Newman argue that a detailed understanding of the modus operandi of a terrorist’s act—and analysis of the operational concept—will enable an effective counter-plan to be developed. The approach grew out of crime prevention design methodologies developed since the 1980s and has evolved into an analysis of how to reduce opportunities for committing a terrorist act.

The Significance of Deception

In the case of the 2007 Haymarket attacks, factors such as deception and timing also played a key role in the tactical development of the attack. Deployment of the Haymarket vehicles was typical of mimicking operations.¹⁷ These vehicles had good information-deception properties. Given the high-status area represented by Haymarket, parking a Mercedes could be considered typical and unobtrusive for this time of day and location. This explains the success of the perpetrators in deploying these vehicles in the first place. We can see in this situation a clear tactical relationship with the 2005 July London Underground attacks, where information-deception issues played a crucial role in the attack methodology. Specifically,

• the physical and architectural qualities of the London Underground afforded the perpetrators advantages in terms of security and cover, and
• the ability to use commuter crowding as camouflage aided use of deception tactics to achieve mission success.

      A final part of the vulnerability analysis needs to be able to incorporate an understanding as to how deception on the part of an attacker’s operational concept impacts on the analysis conclusions. The deception question is very complicated, and involves understanding related issues, such as

• The timing of an attack, which sometimes is referred to as the ‘fourth dimension’ to 3D tactics;¹⁸ and
• The use of deception tactics and consideration of the sort of camouflage opportunities a potential site offers the attacker.

      From a methodology view, analysis should be based on target situational opportunities. Explaining the concept of target situational opportunities, Ronald Clarke and Graeme Newman observe that “Differences in terrorist methodology can be uncovered if the movements of a terrorist are traced, step by step, from the beginning to the end of his or her mission. As a result, the opportunities can be identified that terrorists must exploit in order to complete their attacks, and the decisions they make based on these.”¹⁹       To this, Paul Ekblom adds the idea of a “conjunction of terrorist opportunity.” This identifies how terrorism involves an attractive, vulnerable, or provocative target in an environment that is conductive to an act of terrorism.²⁰ Opportunity can cover issues such as linear routes, timing, accessibility, and weaponization; all of these need to be considered as key components.       Deception or mimicking operations serve to increase overall tactical effectiveness and form an important tactical underpinning to any terrorist operational concept. Additionally, it is advanced here that we need to approach tactical analysis in such a way as to analyze 3D space from a prevention perspective. This must account for the complexity of 3D space; otherwise vulnerabilities are missed, as are the associations with opportunities. In particular, we need to consider the use and interpretation of information.       The core aspect of the information issue is the use and employment of deception tactics.²¹ Tactically speaking, acts of terrorism are fundamentally supported by acts of deception. For instance, placement of a typical vehicle concealing an IED on a street where it will not be noticed (because it is of a type normally there, at that particular time), or a person carrying a backpack (where people are always carrying one), constitutes use of deception, and this type of tactic has formed an essential basis to the acts of terrorism in New York, Madrid, London, and Bali.

Counterterrorism in the 3D Space

From a purely tactical perspective, 3D tactics address the third dimension, which is the space above and below ground level in land and urban operations. However, in terms of conventional thinking, much of our thinking is more rooted in conventional two-dimensional tactical analysis (2D tactics).²² From a 2D tactics viewpoint, mass gatherings are impossible to analyze.       Critically, as well, defeating acts of terrorism straddles both policing and security (in a peacetime urban setting), as well as effectively an urban combat situation. However, most of our conventional thinking in urban warfare concepts does not translate into a civil environment. This is because traditional security and defense operations do not transcend into an essentially peaceful environment that includes crowded lunchtime shoppers, buses in transit, and delivery vans. Finally, an additional problem is that conventional land tactics are not geared toward true three-dimensional analyses.       Current thinking, however, is largely embedded in concepts of linear security common to conventional land operations. Conventional land tactics are still constructed from staged-base components (sequential actions and line-of-sight analysis). As well, from a legal perspective of engagement rules practiced by security, military, and police ultimately become locked into two-dimensional tactics because of the need to react only with minimal force and to keep the potential loss of innocent life (in the peacetime urban context) at an absolute minimum, while terrorists are not so constrained.

Conclusion

Using the 3D tactics approach is the best model available to deal properly with mass gathering spaces. The relevance to defense, security, or policing is that this type of analysis increasingly will be needed for (1) the development of area protection against asymmetric threats of terrorism and (2) integration of this planning with police, security, and counterterrorism strategies for defending urban mass gathering spaces. A review of current professional engineering security consulting practices demonstrates the need for tools such as 3D tactics analysis. In addition, the analysis utilizes other specialist techniques, such as

• cluster-modeling,
• identifying the situational vulnerabilities, and
• linear analysis all within a geographic information systems-based approach.

Dr. Chris Flaherty is a leading commentator on security, defense, and counterterrorism research, its application, and project management. Chris has established an international career in vulnerability and resilience analysis. He has pioneered concepts such as 3D tactics, fragmentation, and weaponization of buildings. Chris has developed a counterterrorism building vulnerability analysis for mass gathering commercial, industrial, and shopping areas. As well, he gives critical infrastructure protection policy advice. His contact email is chris.flaherty at greymans dot com.

Notes:

7. UK Intelligence and Security Committee, Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005, May 2006, p. 24. [↩]
8. ibid., pp. 6-7. [↩]
9. Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, Director General of MI5, Speech given at the Ridderzaal, Binnenhof, the Hague, Netherlands. www.mi5.gov.uk/output/Page387.html (1 September 2005). [↩]
10. U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency, FEMA 426 – Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, December 2003, p. 1-1. [↩]
11. Flaherty, C. (2007) “3D Tactics: An Advanced Warfare Concept in Critical Infrastructure Protection,” International Journal of Emergency Management, Vol. 4, No. 1. p. 33. [↩]
12. Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, p. 1-45. [↩]
13. Flaherty, pp. 33-44. [↩]
14. Blackwell, C. “A Multi-layered Security Architecture for Modelling Critical Infrastructure.” Paper for 7th European Conference on Information Warfare and Security (University of Plymouth, UK, 30 June – 1 July 2008). Proceedings on CD-ROM format (Blackwell, p. 1). [↩]
15. Roach, J., P. Ekblom, and R. Flynn. “The Conjunction of Terrorist Opportunity: A Framework for Diagnosing and Preventing Acts of Terrorism,” Security Journal 18 (3), 2005, pp. 12-13. [↩]
16. Clarke, R.V. and G.R. Newman, “Reducing the Opportunities for Terrorism: Applying the Principles of Situational Crime Prevention,” in Terrorism and Torture: An Interdisciplinary Perspective, edited by Werner Stritzke et al. Cambridge University Press. In press (not yet published–available from July 2009). [↩]
17. Flaherty, C.J. (December 2003) “Mimicking Operations,” Australian Army Journal, p. 12. [↩]
18. Flaherty, C. (September 2008) “3D Tactics and Information Deception,” Journal of Information Warfare. Vol. 7, issue 2. pp. 49-58. [↩]
19. Clarke, R.V. and G.R. Newman. [↩]
20. Roach, J., P. Ekblom, and R. Flynn. pp. 8-9. [↩]
21. For an extended discussion of this topic see Flaherty, C. (September 2008), pp. 49-58. [↩]
22. For an extended discussion on 3D versus 2D tactics in urban combat, see Flaherty, C. (to be published August 2009) “2D Verses 3D Tactical Supremacy in Urban Operations.” Journal of Information Warfare. Vol. 8, Issue 2. This was based on an earlier version: Flaherty, C. “2D Verses 3D Tactical Supremacy in Urban Operations.” 4th International Conference on Information Warfare and Security. Cape Town, South Africa, 26-27 March 2009. Proceedings of ICIW 2009. pp 10-17. [↩]

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