Charles Martel writes in to challenge what he views as the hegemonic interpretation of the Millennium Challenge 2002 wargame:
The key to Red Teaming is to ascertain and draw conclusions based on the facts and not just conventional wisdom. …[Van Riper's] actions during the experiment pointed out flaws in the implementation of some of the concepts under study. Those failures were documented then the experiment continued. van Riper was upset that the experiment wasn’t halted in the middle since ‘he had won.’ The leadership at the time felt it was better to reset the conditions and see how the concepts could be applied after the bluefor had learned a hard lesson. As a result of the experiment, some of the experimental concepts were canned, others modified. Seemed like exactly what an experiment is supposed to do.”
As perhaps the most controversial wargame of recent times, MC2002 undoubtedly provokes strong discussion. So I’ll open this up to RTJ readers: is the current interpretation of MC2002 wrongheaded? Has the process of mythmaking clouded accurate analysis? Does MC2002 have relevance to greater US defense policy and strategy, or is it a relic of the Rumsfeld age? Lastly, did MC2002 pose a fatal blow to some Transformation concepts or simply indicate correctable flaws? We would especially like to hear from those involved in the exercise.
{ 9 comments }
James Montgomery 07.28.09 at 11:55 am
The results of MC2002 has indeed taken on a life of its own. Anyone who has picked up a copy of Gladwell’s book Blink has read about it. A quick search on the internet will also yield a multitude of hits talking about how LTG Van Riper “stuck it to the man” during this exercise. This exercise, admittedly for me, was the sole reason I became interested in red teaming in the first place. That having been said, I don’t see MC2002 as a failure of any sort. I see it as an outstanding advertisement for stepping outside of the group thinking mentality.
As decision support experts, we should always see any result as a product of the decisions we make. I have always attested that the recommendations red reamers make are not to negate a plan but to ensure a plan is in place to combat negative results. It’s not win or lose, it’s “did we think of that?”
Adam Elkus 07.28.09 at 1:51 pm
I actually haven’t read Blink, but it’s not surprising that Gladwell has picked it up.
I think this is important: “As decision support experts, we should always see any result as a product of the decisions we make. I have always attested that the recommendations red reamers make are not to negate a plan but to ensure a plan is in place to combat negative results. It’s not win or lose, it’s “did we think of that?””
To a large degree, the exercise is tied to the larger debate of the Rumsfeld era and the technologies and strategies he instituted. EBO vs. MDMP, Systems vs. Clausewitz, new research on war vs. the “war is war is war” perspectives. It’s ultimately an old debate, and it will really never be over.
Rather, we need to look critically at the parameters of that debate and some of the intellectual weaknesses in both sides’ cases.
Tim 07.28.09 at 5:39 pm
MC2002 is also mentioned in the latest Foreign Affairs, in an essay by Andrew Krepinevich. The cost of the exercise is mind boggling even if the numbers are inflated.
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/krepinevichs-essay-implies-dis/
deichmans 07.29.09 at 5:13 pm
Actually, Mr. Martel is wrong. Rip was not “upset” that the game continued — he fully acknowledged that the event needed to continue. His fear was that flaws in the concepts (like Rapid Decisive Ops and Effects-Based Ops) would be glossed over and ignored, with the event declared an overall “success”. He voluntarily stepped down as the Red Team’s ‘Senior Mentor’ when he realized his Chief of Staff (a contractor employee from the USJFCOM J7 OPFOR) was being given contradictory orders by his real-world bosses.
Since he was deliberately excluded from the Flag/General Officer “huddles” (since the J9 was unsuccessful in ‘firing’ him following one of the precursor Limited Objective Experiments several months prior), Rip had a lot of spare time on his hands. He used that to write a scathing critique of the event, some of the unclassified elements showing up as Chapter 4 of Gladwell’s _BLINK_. My criticism of Gladwell is that his book makes no mention whatsoever of the counterfactuals, nor of the Command’s perspective. But I guess a NYTimes best selling author can get away with a slanted, single-perspective story….
As for the cost, remember that the costs cited include not only eighteen months of staff work by hundreds of people fully dedicated to the event — it also includes over 10,000 real-world forces like the Army’s Interim Brigade Combat Team that participated remotely from the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California.
Adam Elkus 07.29.09 at 5:32 pm
Thanks for writing in. Perhaps Ed Beakley could also chime in as well.
Gladwell’s picking up of the event is also pretty interesting–it shows MC2002′s influence way beyond the rather select military sphere from which it originated.
Adam Elkus 07.30.09 at 1:32 am
Also, Wings over Iraq has a related discussion on free-play and red-teaming: http://wingsoveriraq.blogspot.com/2009/07/regarding-freeplay-freeplay-not.html
Starbuck 07.30.09 at 1:39 am
I didn’t realize you guys were doing this topic as well. Tonight I’ll link to this article and send some people this way.
Adam Elkus 07.30.09 at 2:32 am
Thanks!
Charles Martel 08.01.09 at 8:02 pm
The result have indeed taken on a life of their own, but most of those who have talked about it weren’t there. The idea that Paul wanted it to continue but wrote a scathing critique of the event doesn’t pass the critical thinking test expected of red teamers.
The cost was indeed enormous because there was no ability to cut off “good ideas” so we had to segment the conceptual portions from non-essential pieces in order to isolate their contribution — while simultaneously trying to identify useful or damaging interactions. A mammoth task in any experiment. Could have been done better and cheaper for sure, but everyone wanted their pet project to play and there was precious little documented experience in operational experimentation — since the Louisiana Maneuvers anyway (the real ones I mean).
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