To add to Tim’s excellent rundown of failures in red teaming, another pressing issue is the fact that red teaming that demonstrates weaknesses in operational and strategic concepts is not always accepted by policy-makers. Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper’s performance during the Millennium Challenge 2002 exercises is often cited as a paramount example of red teaming results being ignored by policymakers. Riper used asymmetric tactics to stymie a numerically superior force equipped with top of the line command and control systems, thus demonstrating the weaknesses of many of the military concepts that come to prominence during the late 90′s and early 2000s.
Central to Brigadier General H.R. McMaster’s Vietnam-era civil-military study Dereliction of Duty (as well as many critical military histories of Vietnam) are the SIGMA series wagames, which predicted numerous problems in the Johnson administration’s Vietnam strategy. In one 1963 game, the end result was 500,000 troops deployed to the country and draft riots at home. Other games suggested that strategic bombing and the deployment of large-scale forces in the South would not compel North Vietnam to back down. Furthermore, participants noted that while BLUE Force had an overwhelmingly short-run and tactical focus while RED focused on long term and strategic objectives–putting less stock in short-term tactical victories.
What both examples demonstrate is that the success or failure of red teaming exercises is dependent on the policy process. Much is dependent on how the lessons of the red team are received, interpreted, and integrated into tactical, operational, or strategic planning.
Red teaming and alternative analysis for national security and business advantage.
{ 3 comments }
Mark Mateski 07.23.09 at 8:12 pm
Adam,
I agree; it often doesn’t matter how good a red team is if the policy maker is already committed to a given path or policy.
This, I think, can lead to a discussion of the broad set of factors that inhibit good decisions. I tend to group these factors into five classes—individual, organizational, cultural, situational, and adversarial. The organizational class, for example, includes factors such as groupthink, the pressure to conform, policy bias, the size and complexity of modern organizations, parochialism, rivalry, and so on. Taken as a whole, these factors yield effects such as complacency, overconfidence, wishful thinking, predictability, and susceptibility to surprise—effects good red teaming is designed to counter.
Given the many possible combinations of factors and effects, it’s a wonder good things ever happen. The main balancing condition is probably the simple fact that one’s opponent is also vulnerable to the same set factors and effects.
Adam Elkus 07.23.09 at 9:11 pm
“Given the many possible combinations of factors and effects, it’s a wonder good things ever happen. The main balancing condition is probably the simple fact that one’s opponent is also vulnerable to the same set factors and effects.”
I agree. JFCOM did one of the more interesting studies of al-Qaeda’s vulnerabilities: http://www.amazon.com/Terrorist-Perspectives-Project-Operational-Associated/dp/1591144639
Charles Martel 07.25.09 at 2:53 pm
The key to Red Teaming is to ascertain and draw conclusions based on the facts and not just conventional wisdom. The reference to van Riper’s actions at Millennium Challenge ’02 are based on the legend van Riper has concocted, but the people on the ground recognized that he was simply grandstanding. His actions during the experiment pointed out flaws in the implementation of some of the concepts under study. Those failures were documented then the experiment continued. van Riper was upset that the experiment wasn’t halted in the middle since “he had won.” The leadership at the time felt it was better to reset the conditions and see how the concepts could be applied after the bluefor had learned a hard lesson. As a result of the experiment, some of the experimental concepts were canned, others modified. Seemed like exactly what an experiment is supposed to do. No one, except Paul, thought it was about personal gain.
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