Comments on: Red Teaming: A Failure to Communicate http://redteamjournal.com/2009/07/red-teaming-a-failure-to-communicate/ Red teaming and alternative analysis for national security and business advantage. Wed, 06 Jul 2011 16:48:12 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Charles Martel http://redteamjournal.com/2009/07/red-teaming-a-failure-to-communicate/comment-page-1/#comment-1086 Charles Martel Sat, 25 Jul 2009 18:53:29 +0000 http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1806#comment-1086 The key to Red Teaming is to ascertain and draw conclusions based on the facts and not just conventional wisdom. The reference to van Riper's actions at Millennium Challenge '02 are based on the legend van Riper has concocted, but the people on the ground recognized that he was simply grandstanding. His actions during the experiment pointed out flaws in the implementation of some of the concepts under study. Those failures were documented then the experiment continued. van Riper was upset that the experiment wasn't halted in the middle since "he had won." The leadership at the time felt it was better to reset the conditions and see how the concepts could be applied after the bluefor had learned a hard lesson. As a result of the experiment, some of the experimental concepts were canned, others modified. Seemed like exactly what an experiment is supposed to do. No one, except Paul, thought it was about personal gain. The key to Red Teaming is to ascertain and draw conclusions based on the facts and not just conventional wisdom. The reference to van Riper’s actions at Millennium Challenge ’02 are based on the legend van Riper has concocted, but the people on the ground recognized that he was simply grandstanding. His actions during the experiment pointed out flaws in the implementation of some of the concepts under study. Those failures were documented then the experiment continued. van Riper was upset that the experiment wasn’t halted in the middle since “he had won.” The leadership at the time felt it was better to reset the conditions and see how the concepts could be applied after the bluefor had learned a hard lesson. As a result of the experiment, some of the experimental concepts were canned, others modified. Seemed like exactly what an experiment is supposed to do. No one, except Paul, thought it was about personal gain.

]]> By: Adam Elkus http://redteamjournal.com/2009/07/red-teaming-a-failure-to-communicate/comment-page-1/#comment-1053 Adam Elkus Fri, 24 Jul 2009 01:11:49 +0000 http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1806#comment-1053 "Given the many possible combinations of factors and effects, it’s a wonder good things ever happen. The main balancing condition is probably the simple fact that one’s opponent is also vulnerable to the same set factors and effects." I agree. JFCOM did one of the more interesting studies of al-Qaeda's vulnerabilities: http://www.amazon.com/Terrorist-Perspectives-Project-Operational-Associated/dp/1591144639 “Given the many possible combinations of factors and effects, it’s a wonder good things ever happen. The main balancing condition is probably the simple fact that one’s opponent is also vulnerable to the same set factors and effects.”

I agree. JFCOM did one of the more interesting studies of al-Qaeda’s vulnerabilities: http://www.amazon.com/Terrorist-Perspectives-Project-Operational-Associated/dp/1591144639

]]> By: Mark Mateski http://redteamjournal.com/2009/07/red-teaming-a-failure-to-communicate/comment-page-1/#comment-1049 Mark Mateski Fri, 24 Jul 2009 00:12:07 +0000 http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1806#comment-1049 Adam, I agree; it often doesn’t matter how good a red team is if the policy maker is already committed to a given path or policy. This, I think, can lead to a discussion of the broad set of factors that inhibit good decisions. I tend to group these factors into five classes—individual, organizational, cultural, situational, and adversarial. The organizational class, for example, includes factors such as groupthink, the pressure to conform, policy bias, the size and complexity of modern organizations, parochialism, rivalry, and so on. Taken as a whole, these factors yield effects such as complacency, overconfidence, wishful thinking, predictability, and susceptibility to surprise—effects good red teaming is designed to counter. Given the many possible combinations of factors and effects, it's a wonder good things ever happen. The main balancing condition is probably the simple fact that one's opponent is also vulnerable to the same set factors and effects. Adam,

I agree; it often doesn’t matter how good a red team is if the policy maker is already committed to a given path or policy.

This, I think, can lead to a discussion of the broad set of factors that inhibit good decisions. I tend to group these factors into five classes—individual, organizational, cultural, situational, and adversarial. The organizational class, for example, includes factors such as groupthink, the pressure to conform, policy bias, the size and complexity of modern organizations, parochialism, rivalry, and so on. Taken as a whole, these factors yield effects such as complacency, overconfidence, wishful thinking, predictability, and susceptibility to surprise—effects good red teaming is designed to counter.

Given the many possible combinations of factors and effects, it’s a wonder good things ever happen. The main balancing condition is probably the simple fact that one’s opponent is also vulnerable to the same set factors and effects.

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