For the last three years ,there has been a stream of articles, op-eds, and reports about the expansion of Iranian influence and proxies in the near abroad. These contacts include a large presence in South American Middle Eastern diasporas, official contacts with anti-American “Bolivarian” regimes, and fund-raising on US soil. At the same time, US access to Latin America is steadily decreasing due to a wave of anti-American sentiment, the closing of bases used for counter-narcotics operations, and a decline in American influence.
The official response to such intrusive measures is either below the radar or non-existent. Granted, US room for maneuver in the region is very small. Like in Mexico, residual distrust of the US impedes a more active role in combating the threat. But the threat is real and serious thought should be devoted towards managing or containing the expansion of Iranian influence. The first–and most important–step that must be taken is to ascertain the nature of proxy penetration in Latin America. At least in the open source there is little concrete information about the extent of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) in Latin America, and a great deal of rumor and conjecture about the tri-border region, Mexico, and Iran. More specifics are needed.
The Iran threat (which at its core is state-based) is meshing with a growing military threat posed by the expansion of privatized criminal-military organizations and the expansion of autonomous zones within the fabric of the Mexican state. While the two threats do not intersect, they need to both be understood within the context of a larger battlespace being opened under America’s southern flank, a development that largely eluded most foreign policy and security commentators.
From the monthly archives:
October 2009
The American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Auslin has an interesting post about technology and paradigm shifts. It is quite pessimistic:
“There is much discussion of asymmetric weapons systems, disruptive technologies, and new warfighting frontiers. Concerns over anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, cyber warfare, and electro-magnetic pulse are getting increasing attention by military thinkers. Yet, it is hard to avoid the sense that technology is outstripping our ability to conceptualize not merely tactical response but even strategic calculations. Our network-linked force is more lethal than ever before, but that in turn now makes it possibly among the most vulnerable. Are our warfighters, and their supporting circles, truly prepared for a conflict that might obviate the vast and crucial advantages the U.S. military now possesses over any other force on earth? “
Perhaps the biggest barrier to conceptualizing technological and tactical shifts is the lack of experience against a comparable conventional combatant. The first and second Gulf Wars, while no picnics, did not feature a truly comparable adversary. Since Auslin makes a metaphor to the technological and tactical changes that prefigured World War I, it is important to point out that with the important exception of the Franco-Prussian War, most of the European powers that fought in the conflict spent the decades beforehand in colonial warfare. While some colonial conflicts (most notably the Boer war) prefigured changes in world conflict, beating down the Sudanese mahdi did not necessarily provide the British with proper preparation for engaging the Germans. While the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have provided plenty of valuable lessons, there is a reason why the Pentagon is focusing so intently on a war that it didn’t fight–the 2006 Lebanon war. However, even this might not be much of a guide to how a future opponent might fight a positional war. There is a danger of tactics being drawn up as an “ideal type” that does not correspond to the direction of future conflict.
