For the last three years ,there has been a stream of articles, op-eds, and reports about the expansion of Iranian influence and proxies in the near abroad. These contacts include a large presence in South American Middle Eastern diasporas, official contacts with anti-American “Bolivarian” regimes, and fund-raising on US soil. At the same time, US access to Latin America is steadily decreasing due to a wave of anti-American sentiment, the closing of bases used for counter-narcotics operations, and a decline in American influence.
The official response to such intrusive measures is either below the radar or non-existent. Granted, US room for maneuver in the region is very small. Like in Mexico, residual distrust of the US impedes a more active role in combating the threat. But the threat is real and serious thought should be devoted towards managing or containing the expansion of Iranian influence. The first–and most important–step that must be taken is to ascertain the nature of proxy penetration in Latin America. At least in the open source there is little concrete information about the extent of foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) in Latin America, and a great deal of rumor and conjecture about the tri-border region, Mexico, and Iran. More specifics are needed.
The Iran threat (which at its core is state-based) is meshing with a growing military threat posed by the expansion of privatized criminal-military organizations and the expansion of autonomous zones within the fabric of the Mexican state. While the two threats do not intersect, they need to both be understood within the context of a larger battlespace being opened under America’s southern flank, a development that largely eluded most foreign policy and security commentators.
Red teaming and alternative analysis for national security and business advantage.
{ 3 comments… read them below or add one }
Guile 10.08.09 at 4:37 pm
Adam, a critical conclusion you reach is that the Iranian “threat” is mixing with Mexican criminal-military entities (paraphrased). First, you have not discussed specific objectives of the Iranians and so what the “threat” is, is rather murky. As you wrote, “More specifics are needed.” Second, I interpret your reference to “Mexican criminal-military organizations” to mean the increasingly violent and armed drug cartels. The most obvious (to me anyway) worry about interaction of the drug cartels with representatives of the ME would be a relationship with Al Qaeda.
You claim the “Iranian” threat and that from the Mexican criminal-military entities are not intersecting. Then what else can you say about the nature of the “meshing?” Are there any open-source analyses?
A.E. 10.08.09 at 5:30 pm
It was a short blog post that is a stand-in for a longer analysis currently being written. There has been little real open-source research about Iranian motives in Latin America beyond commercial expansion and to cause a thorn in the side of the US.
I use the term “mesh”, as my last paragraph indicates, as a sign that there is a larger problem of challenge to US security posed by new developments in the southern battlespace. This does not literally mean that Zetas and Iranians are mixing.
As for al-Qaeda, there has not been credible open-source evidence of local collaboration. If security degenerates in border regions, however, it might be an ideal space to situate themselves.
Coach 11.04.09 at 12:30 pm
Correct. There is little information linking al-Qaeda in South America for now. However, Hezbollah appears to be active in the tri-border region, specifically in the area of Puerto Iguazu, Paraguay, long a hub for smuggling. In addition, there has been considerable Arab immigration into S. America, specifically, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Honduras among others. At first it was mainly Christian Lebanese, Syrians and Palestinians; after the mid-1980’s it took on a more Muslim character (example – Carlos Menem, former Argentine president, born Muslim of Syrian parents, converted to Catholicism to be elected president). They have been active in banking and general commerce. Although the greater majority is made up of law abiding citizens and well assimilated, a small minority can provide cover. (N.B. over a period of 21 years, I lived in Brazil for 4 and traveled extensively to the region during that time, so this is personal observation.)