The mathmatics of war is a facinating study and if it can help predict violence on the battlefield it will be a big brak through. Still trying to grasp this study and the determinate effect on conflcit and violence.

Very interesting!

The early cellular automata (finite state machine) “life” simulation is one example that has been extended to more complex situations such as populations of fox and rabbit. Simulations are used to show how these populations lead to feast, famine, extinction, and perhaps steady state. It would seem this is analogous to opposing forces are interposed over each other’s zones of operation.

Fox versus rabbit outcomes are likely stochastic based upon observations or speculation. Interactions are not 3D or even simulated in situ—they are rolls of the dice. One could do this with any red-blue interaction, and if sufficiently described by observation or theory, would be enough to answer a number of high level questions. It seems adding additional fidelity is necessary in the interactions you propose because the questions being asked do not have a base of observation sufficient to reduce the question to a stochastic calculation or table look-up. Complexity of interaction in tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) along with technology insertion are significant enough that you need to model more detail. Considering 3D is important because you’re operating in a 3D terrain and the complexity of interaction exists in these dimensions.

Depending on how you model it, there are other dimensions we could consider. Communications via radio might be another dimension. Environment variables such as day/night, clear/smoky, knowledge, culture, training, relationships, etc., might be important. All these can be collapsed into a 3D environment in which we are believed to exist even thought they might be more efficiently modeled in a higher-dimensional space. Given 3D space, the fourth dimension of time in simulation is usually left to concept of time-stepped or discreet event.

Given that discussion, your article calls for more 3D concepts in tactics. What exactly is needed in simulation (existing and novel) to solve such problems?

I’m not sure exactly how the thoughts of “a totally chaotic battlefield” fit in. I would think that red-blue TTPs and technology would add some level of order to the problem that would dominate the outcome of interactions. Perhaps “totally chaotic” represents the unknown elements that come into play before an even when intelligence about impending attacks or other events is scarce?

We’ve been working a number of these problems in existing theaters with the Umbra-based Dante tool for concepts of interposing tactics that model behavior of individuals, equipment, weapons, RF communication, terrain, buildings, etc. We’ve had somewhat emergent results in issues of friendly fire, coordination of convoy operation, team operations in urban environments, etc.

I think that a tactical question at hand is how we solve these types of problems or investigate them further in research. Will they be solved via closed-form equations and calculations? Will they be solved through time-stepped simulation? I tend to have bias here toward simulation because of the complexity of the domain and immaturity of our calculus for such problems. I think how we will approach the problem for solution is currently as important as the problem itself. Without a number of tools to evaluate various hypotheses and evaluate real situations, we won’t make much progress.

-I had a problem in discerning the exact scale and time you are addressing. You identify the individual dots to be as small as individual people and weapons, then referenced Liddell Hart’s assertion of platoons. I think that the sense of scale is directly tied to the sense of time. Are we talking about really small unit tactics that cover the course of a few hours to a day, or are we talking something more substantial, such as looking at the insurgency in an area over the course of weeks and months (if not years)? The assumption made in this regard has significant impact on the resulting analysis of operations. If we are looking at how two forces would struggle to achieve immediate objectives within a short time frame, then the idea of individuals is apt. However, if we are looking at longer term “campaign”, even over the same terrain, how we look at and group, the individual pieces would be different.

-A basic assumption in looking at distributed forces is the assessed capability and resiliency of each individual element. Can we assume that each element, if detected and engaged by an opposing element, would result in some sort of draw? If two friendly elements are able to “mass” on a single enemy element, do the odds of successful engagement rise by some factor? The survivability issue is critical, I think, to determine how elements coordinate with each other, and act against their opposition. If there is gain to geographic massing, either in terms of capability, or survivability (and this could be different against different threats), that would reflect in the calculus of action.

-Another issue that impacts on element size and survival is that of detection threshold. Arguably, the reason why insurgents work in smaller groups is because it’s harder to detect them in the first place. The advantage of “swarm” is to maneuver a large capability/force in such a way that it does not provide the traditional signature of a large force. One reason why counterinsurgents also work in smaller units is that they have a better chance of detecting the equally small adversary elements. For me, this points to the fact that a great part of the strength of the dispersed force lies in its avoidance of detection. Whoever can be more successful at the detection competition, will then be potentially able to isolate the enemy elements and mass effectively against them. Moving in a larger concentration obviates some of the detection worry through the security provided by the mass itself. For many reasons not related to pure combat power considerations, Counter-insurgents, or Security forces have to be visible. Thus, they are already at a disadvantage in the detection game.

-As you point out, our concept of terrain must change. I’d offer that the population (concentration vs. dispersed, etc.) makes another factor in considering traditional geography. Freedom of movement for the insurgent can be based on a combination of terrain factors (physically concealed routes, etc.) and population factors (moving with normal traffic, crowds, etc.). Terrain analysis is critical to this type of approach, because it will dictate how dispersed elements can get. Also, there is always some sort of key terrain (and it can be of a social or political nature) that drives concentration. If this is looking at a longer term campaign, then the Jominian approach of physical lines of operation may still have bearing. Over the longer term, both forces must receive logistics support from somewhere to continue operating. The idea of self-supporting free-range access around the battlespace only applies in a short term sense. Threatening, or cutting off a force form its base, whether it be dispersed or not, will still have a significant impact. It could be argued that a dispersed force actually complicates the logistics issue.

-I’m a little confused on the term “net-fighter.” Is it in terms of the forces being physically spread, as in a net, or does it imply a networked force, that is enabled by superior communications and information systems? This is important, because I believe that the command and control (C2) philosophy and capability are fundamental underpinnings of the capability to operate dispersed. I see two options here, an explicit approach and an implicit approach. An explicit approach relies on the ability to quickly communicate and share information. An implicit approach relies more on common understanding, shared assumptions about how to operate and why to operate—action is less based on explicit direction. Obviously, a real world force would probably feature a combination of the two. However, the philosophical starting point is important. I see the difference as being between the Network-centric Warfare (NCW) approach and the maneuver Warfare (MW) approach (MW as espoused on US Marine Corps doctrine, primarily MCDP 1 “Warfighting” and MCDP 6 “Command and Control”). The NCW approach, as I have seen it, relies on using the explicit means (comm., information systems, etc.) as the foundation. Implicit means can be developed during operations, however they are not central to the capability. MW, on the other hand, builds on a foundation of implicit means—mutual trust and common understanding. Explicit means just further enhance the already developed relationships. There are various ways to develop implicit understanding. Most commonly, we think of highly trained cohesive forces with great individual initiative. However, there is the alternate of a force that follows, unwaveringly, a few simple rules of behavior as individuals that result in large-scale coherent operations.

-The bottom-line to the above discourse is that the C2 philosophy, and its dependencies and methods for driving action, will have a critical impact on how dispersed forces react to one another. A force relaying on networks is vulnerable to disruption of those networks. A force reliant on implicit means may make fundamentally bad assumptions about the situation, etc. In the end, somehow, C2 needs to be factored into the theory.

-Finally, there’a lot of good stuff out there on dispersed operations. One recent document I’d point you to is “Distributed Manoeuvre: 21st Century Offensive Tactics” from the Australian Land Warfare Studies Centre” (http://www.defence.gov.au/Army/lwsc/WP134.asp).

Once again, thanks for a thought-provoking piece.
Semper Fi,
Phil Ridderhof USMC

It is riskier and you will need superior situational awarenss, not just technology wise but individuals on the ground, fine tuned and honed when it comes to awarenss and hence the abilyty to stay on the initiative driven side of the Boyd Cycle. Then just maybe we have them playing our game?

I will say this the artcile has had me thinking all day as it relates to law enforcement. Most of the criminal element are opportunistic and wait for the cops to be out of site. Marked police cars and well lighted staions with patrol cars all parked there help give the sign that the coast is clear to operate. The same would hold true in a force protection mode I would think. the adversary can see the overwhelming force, where its held up and then go where they believe its safe to operate.

I am thinking out loud here…Basically using these convergent and interposing tactics we are in multiple strategic locations, monitoring routes of travel, smuggling and surveillance routes, other operations etc of the adversary. We are disrupting their normal operations, they screw up, they get discouraged and eventuall we learn more, then pull them off the street or whatever it takes to apprehend or stop them.

Its not about attrition in my view its about manuever. But when force on force becomes neccessary and we are postioned right we may have the advantge to swarm and seize the moment using whatever force is warrrnated or neccessary.

You do have have to have the willingness to be up close and personal and allow the frontlines to take initiative and make decisions on the fly in my view. Fail to do this and you cannot operate this way because you decision making will be too damn slow. Your point there is well taken.

This will take consistant training by taking advantage of every lesson learned. So we constantly learning-unlearning and re-learning so we get better at gathering and developing actionable information. Again in my view REAL TIME superior situational awarenss is key.

Definately intersting i am enjoying the back and forth. Look forward to more insight.

Fred

A question: where does net-fighter v net-fighter and interposing tactics lead to? Does it amount to playing the enemy at his own game? At best, the conclusion would seem to be a stalemate after a prolonged attritional fight.

Another question is whether western forces, as currently constituted, and indeed police forces, have the mindset and wherewithal (sufficient numbers, intelligence, willingness to engage in close and autonomous combat) to operate in this fashion.

The value of interposing tactics may be to use some elements (net-fighters) to screen, distract and draw away enemy fighters, while concentrating force to achieve particular objectives at minimal cost.