Comments on: Acknowledging the Adversary in Risk Assessment http://redteamjournal.com/2010/01/acknowledging-the-adversary-in-risk-assessment/ Red teaming and alternative analysis for national security and business advantage. Wed, 06 Jul 2011 16:48:12 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.1 By: Chris Flaherty http://redteamjournal.com/2010/01/acknowledging-the-adversary-in-risk-assessment/comment-page-1/#comment-2243 Chris Flaherty Wed, 27 Jan 2010 11:09:39 +0000 http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2091#comment-2243 My work on 3D tactics and also 3D vulnerability analysis grew out of the need to develop a tactical lexicon about how an attack is thought about in complex space, in order to fill-out the scenario narratives, needed to focus the engineering and security team (as well as the client) on particular vulnerability clusters within urban spaces. This was needed in order to circumvent the need for a threat assessment, where none was forthcoming or could be produced. This is the reasoning behind my article on this web site - Flaherty, C. (12 July 2009) A New Approach to Mass Space. Red Team Journal.com. URL: http://redteamjournal.com/2009/07/a-new-approach-to-mass-space/ Problematically, in general terms the issue of the adversary is becoming increasingly vexed. I say this because we have available at hand, methodologies outside of traditional security risk analysis, such as: (i) red teaming; (ii) threat assessments; or (iii) pre-identification of potential critical targets. All of which, instead of being component methodologies, are becoming compartmentalised competitors in the market for the client dollar. The added issue is that the original distinction between risk management, which looked at all-hazards, and security risk management was that in security risk management the risks are the result of either criminal or malicious human interference (causing the very risk that the security risk manager was trying to mitigate). Problematically, the later issue of focus on ‘human interference’, was not developed because of the nullifying effect of the standard definition of a security risk as - “intent + capability”. Thus, the enemy party so to speak, could be treated as relatively neutral within the assessment process. My view is that, we need to conceptually focus in addition on ‘motive’, because that then brings into play the need to assess a real assailant in the equation. My work on 3D tactics and also 3D vulnerability analysis grew out of the need to develop a tactical lexicon about how an attack is thought about in complex space, in order to fill-out the scenario narratives, needed to focus the engineering and security team (as well as the client) on particular vulnerability clusters within urban spaces. This was needed in order to circumvent the need for a threat assessment, where none was forthcoming or could be produced. This is the reasoning behind my article on this web site – Flaherty, C. (12 July 2009) A New Approach to Mass Space. Red Team Journal.com. URL: http://redteamjournal.com/2009/07/a-new-approach-to-mass-space/
Problematically, in general terms the issue of the adversary is becoming increasingly vexed. I say this because we have available at hand, methodologies outside of traditional security risk analysis, such as: (i) red teaming; (ii) threat assessments; or (iii) pre-identification of potential critical targets. All of which, instead of being component methodologies, are becoming compartmentalised competitors in the market for the client dollar. The added issue is that the original distinction between risk management, which looked at all-hazards, and security risk management was that in security risk management the risks are the result of either criminal or malicious human interference (causing the very risk that the security risk manager was trying to mitigate). Problematically, the later issue of focus on ‘human interference’, was not developed because of the nullifying effect of the standard definition of a security risk as – “intent + capability”. Thus, the enemy party so to speak, could be treated as relatively neutral within the assessment process. My view is that, we need to conceptually focus in addition on ‘motive’, because that then brings into play the need to assess a real assailant in the equation.

]]> By: Fred Leland http://redteamjournal.com/2010/01/acknowledging-the-adversary-in-risk-assessment/comment-page-1/#comment-2242 Fred Leland Tue, 26 Jan 2010 12:01:12 +0000 http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2091#comment-2242 Just getting to this post which i feel is very good and speaks to a very valid and often forgotten aspect of assessing threats. A walking, talking and thinking human being as our adversary. Mindset, motive and intent are the center of gravity and where our focus of effort should be in our efforts to assess threats and prevent violence. I have written a couple of pieces at my blog with my thoughts on the topic. here are the links http://lesc.net/blog/conflict-violence-and-art-operations-hellipconnecting-end-strategy-means-tactics and http://lesc.net/blog/coffee-and-conversation-interaction-insight-and-imagination-and-initiativehellipthe-building-bl Your post here is very interesting. I will link to my site as well. Just getting to this post which i feel is very good and speaks to a very valid and often forgotten aspect of assessing threats. A walking, talking and thinking human being as our adversary. Mindset, motive and intent are the center of gravity and where our focus of effort should be in our efforts to assess threats and prevent violence.

I have written a couple of pieces at my blog with my thoughts on the topic. here are the links http://lesc.net/blog/conflict-violence-and-art-operations-hellipconnecting-end-strategy-means-tactics and http://lesc.net/blog/coffee-and-conversation-interaction-insight-and-imagination-and-initiativehellipthe-building-bl

Your post here is very interesting. I will link to my site as well.

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