There’s a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly on the perennial issue of the American interpretation of Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity (COG). The article makes the point that the definition of the COG in Joint Publication 5-0 (as well as the general American interpretation of the COG) is incoherent and proposes a new operational definition: “The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.” The author also argues that a slavish devotion to the COG definition originally laid down by Carl von Clausewitz is inappropriate.
There are two separate issues here. First, although On War is the most transcendent work of military theory ever published, even some of the most ardent Clausewitzians do not treat the work as the Bible or the Quran. So if a concept is no longer useful we should abandon it–Clausewitz himself would understand. The problem is, however, that most of the American problems with the COG concept originated not from the way Clausewitz wrote the concept but how it was defined in American doctrine.
I’ll quote from my SWJ article on the subject:
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) scholar Antulio Echevarria II, however, disagrees with the Paret interpretation. The Army analyst argues that the Paret translation, while the best available, gives the false impression that COG is a source of strength. He then suggests that Clausewitz’s own metaphor is drawn from classical physics’ concept of “the point where the forces of gravity can be said to converge within an object, the spot at which the object’s weight is balanced in all directions. Striking at or otherwise upsetting the center of gravity can cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall to the ground.” In Echevarria’s view, the center of gravity is neither a strength nor weakness. Echevarria explains that the COG is a point of connectivity—a state of unity or purpose from which the opponent comes together. As such, they can be directly attacked to upset the delicate balance. Echevarria argues that Clausewitz’s concept is derived primarily from the mechanical sciences and reflects a holistic and systemic view of the opponent.
This interpretation is remarkably different from how it is expressed in JP 5-0, where the COG “can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.” This, in turn, led to the concept of critical requirements and vulnerabilities, which is an American innovation as well. These are subtle but important differences. In the American conception, the COG is a source of strength that exists on every level of war. In the Clausewitzian concept, the COG is simply a point of connectivity that binds the opponent together. The Clausewitzian concept is, from a practical perspective, more useful. Why?
In James McPherson’s retelling, Abraham Lincoln’s strategic acumen lay in his recognition that the Confederate Army was the COG of the Southern war effort. His generals, on the other hand, were obsessed with maneuvering to gain control of the Southern capitol. Seen in this light, striking the COG had massive effect across the Southern system. This is what an real “effects-based operation” looks like. The Southern Army was neither either purely of strength or weakness, but it was what bound the Southern war effort together. There is nothing really complex about this–as Clausewitz tells us defeating the enemy’s fielded forces is a good idea. This is true either in a campaign of annihilation or erosion.
The critical vulnerabilities and requirements, target value analysis, systems analysis, and campaign design frameworks may be useful in and of themselves in operational art for various purposes. But they have little to do with the Clausewitzian concept of the COG. If we want to use these frameworks we should justify them on their own merits. The COG as Clausewitz originally defined it is also an eminently practical framework. The author’s proposed redefinition also comes close to the Clausewitizian COG definition too.
As campy is it is (especially in light of Chuck Norris’ general canon), the trailer linked above represents one of decision-makers’ worst national security nightmares during the 1960s to the early 1980s: a hijacking and hostages scenario. What UCLA’s David Rapaport calls the “New Left Wave” of paramilitary terrorism featured a number of groups, ranging from highly competent state-supported terrorists with military training and tactical skill to disjointed student radicals playing Che with pipe bombs and poorly written “radical manifestos.” Many groups were somewhat in between. It is sometimes difficult to recognize it in today’s threat environment, but the state’s tactical and operational response to the New Left Wave’s tactical challenge is one of the great success stories in national security policy. [click to continue ...]
What’s new and what’s old? Debate over defense theory and practice has focused much in recent years about the novelty of respective defense theories and terminology. This debate, like the COIN debate, is probably going to continue to go around in circles. Is war more complex than it has been in the past? Probably not. So why do we feel like it is? [click to continue ...]
Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception. Secretary of Defense direct the use of red teaming throughout DOD by developing and employing best practice guides, intellectual focus in professional military education, and more aggressive use of red teams in exercises. The Secretary should also lead by example and establish a strategic-level red team to challenge and inform national security and top level defense policies and strategies.1
We, of course, agree with this recommendation and have offered similar recommendations in the past, including this 2008 call for a red teaming “surge.”
Notes:
This text is drawn from the co-chairs’ submission letter at the start of the report. [↩]
The American Enterprise Institute’s Michael Auslin has an interesting post about technology and paradigm shifts. It is quite pessimistic:
“There is much discussion of asymmetric weapons systems, disruptive technologies, and new warfighting frontiers. Concerns over anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, cyber warfare, and electro-magnetic pulse are getting increasing attention by military thinkers. Yet, it is hard to avoid the sense that technology is outstripping our ability to conceptualize not merely tactical response but even strategic calculations. Our network-linked force is more lethal than ever before, but that in turn now makes it possibly among the most vulnerable. Are our warfighters, and their supporting circles, truly prepared for a conflict that might obviate the vast and crucial advantages the U.S. military now possesses over any other force on earth? “
Perhaps the biggest barrier to conceptualizing technological and tactical shifts is the lack of experience against a comparable conventional combatant. The first and second Gulf Wars, while no picnics, did not feature a truly comparable adversary. Since Auslin makes a metaphor to the technological and tactical changes that prefigured World War I, it is important to point out that with the important exception of the Franco-Prussian War, most of the European powers that fought in the conflict spent the decades beforehand in colonial warfare. While some colonial conflicts (most notably the Boer war) prefigured changes in world conflict, beating down the Sudanese mahdi did not necessarily provide the British with proper preparation for engaging the Germans. While the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have provided plenty of valuable lessons, there is a reason why the Pentagon is focusing so intently on a war that it didn’t fight–the 2006 Lebanon war. However, even this might not be much of a guide to how a future opponent might fight a positional war. There is a danger of tactics being drawn up as an “ideal type” that does not correspond to the direction of future conflict.
Patrick Porter argues against what he views as a “glib” point made by many pundits that the idea of victory has no place in today’s supposedly more complex conflicts:
“Victory has not gone away any more than defeat has. Victory is the securing of desired, or desirable political outcomes from a conflict. It will change its face and its character according to context. Sometimes it will look like parades, formal surrenders and declarations, sometimes it will be a more diffuse and unspectacular process of handing self-government over to an ally whose state one has helped build. The process of translating military breakthroughs into long-term political gains has never been straightforward and has often threatened to break down. While it is possibly harder to achieve in extremely difficult wars of armed nation-building, that doesn’t mean the concept itself has no coherence.”
Porter has hit the nail on the head. Victory has rarely been decisive or lasting in any form of warfare, hence Clausewit’z dictum that “in war the result is never final.” But this very simple idea is incredibly difficult for many to accept. The profound murkiness of conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq is putting this basic truth into sharper view.
Mike Innes of CTLab flags an ongoing trend in conflict studies:
“Somewhere between the relational turn in social science and increasingly granular approaches to warfighting, the reality of international relations, and accounts of the wars being fought from core to periphery, have been looking more and more like exercises in hacking deep ecology. In The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One, David Kilcullen leverages ‘conflict ethnography’ to help explain insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. In Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival In the Siege of Sarajevo, Peter Andreas fine tunes international political economy through a close reading of the lives of the city’s residents. Similarly, in Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering In the Twenty-First Century, Carolyn Nordstrom digs into the ‘deep politics of war’. ..What’s interesting about this – not what’s new, which isn’t what I’m suggesting, but what makes this more engaging and accessible – is that there’s a deep ecology of virtual violence, ambient warfare, and fluid interfaces, and no single discipline has a lock on how best to decipher and map out its surfaces to get at the underneath of things.”
Innes further notes that the “The point not made is that digging at the details, getting to the story beneath the story, means looking to the event beneath the event – to that spot beneath the epicentre that actually constitutes ground zero: the hypocenter.” Ethnographic research is perhaps more appropriate than political science given the vastly smaller scale of today’s conflicts. Local knowledge is always important in war, but these conflicts place a high premium on detailed multidisciplinary study of the “deep ecology” Innes refers to. The more granular one can go, the better. On the red-team side, more granular information produces a better understanding of the dynamics of “small war”–and thus could be grist for more accurate wargames, simulations, and training. An ecological approach to conflict also remedies another deficit–the fact that debate over insurgency and terrorism rarely if ever addresses noncombatants as anything more than passive victims or a feature of the landscape (the human terrain) that must be factored into overall analysis.
If you’ve always wondered how red teaming might apply to business problems, try Carroll and Mui’s 2008 bestseller Billion Dollar Lessons. In it, the authors define a set of common business strategies and discuss how failure often results. In each case, they identify the questions decision makers could have asked that might have helped them avoid failure. They close by arguing for better devil’s advocacy. The issues differ from those that many red teamers typically consider, but the framework is sound, and the principles can easily be ported to other domains. Among other things, Carroll and Mui’s approach suggests that red teaming is not limited to military or security problems.
In the May 11, 2009 issue of The New Yorker, Malcolm Gladwell penned a fascinating study of what happens when underdogs break the rules. The article has relevance to red teaming as Gladwell examines the studies of political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft: [click to continue ...]
Red Team Journal was launched in 1997 to further the practice of red teaming and alternative analysis. The current iteration of the site is designed to help analysts and decision makers improve their ability to generate effective national security and business strategies. Read more here.
