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	<title>Red Team Journal &#187; Articles of interest</title>
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	<description>Red teaming and alternative analysis for national security and business advantage.</description>
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		<title>Review: Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2011/06/review-red-teams-and-counterterrorism-training/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2011/06/review-red-teams-and-counterterrorism-training/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jun 2011 22:02:01 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2689</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Having discussed red-teaming with RTJ Advisory Board member Robert Bunker and his colleague (and my frequent co-author) John P. Sullivan frequently, I was very interested in seeing Bunker&#8217;s new book with Stephen Sloan, Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training. While Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training is a heavily technical book, it is not a simple &#8216;how-to&#8217; [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Having discussed red-teaming with <em>RTJ </em>Advisory Board member Robert Bunker and his colleague (and my frequent co-author) John P. Sullivan frequently, I was very interested in seeing Bunker&#8217;s new book with Stephen Sloan, <em><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Teams-Counterterrorism-Training-Stephen-Sloan/dp/0806141832">Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training</a></em>.<span id="more-2689"></span> While <em>Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training</em> is a heavily technical book, it is not a simple &#8216;how-to&#8217; guide about simulation. It&#8217;s also a work of theory about challenges of the present and future.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Sloan and Bunker&#8217;s point of departure is Sloan&#8217;s late Cold War terrorism classic, <em>Simulating Terrorism</em>, which set the research&#8211;and practice&#8211;agenda for simulating terrorist incidents. While the basic logic of terrorism remains the same, the grammar has shifted towards a much more tactically violent style of enemy whose goal is, to flip the 1970s maxim, to kill a lot of people rather than gain their attention. As such, simulation need to shift towards a different model rooted around everything from the low end of the &#8220;active shooter&#8221; to the high-end of small-unit operations and multiple attackers. As the title indicates, the book concerns both simulation and red-teaming. A major challenge&#8211;especially in a time of declining budgets&#8211;is creating a realistic and valid simulation on the law enforcement level. Bunker and Sloan are mindful of this, and trend towards pragmatic training measures. The sections on red-teaming draw on innovations from theater (Roberta Sloan, a professor of theater, contributes a chapter on role-playing in red-teaming).<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A common theme that runs through the book is the tradeoff between realism (characterized, at the farthest end&#8211;by free-play) and real-world constraints involved in managing simulations and navigating the ultimately complicated bureaucratic and community politics involved in law enforcement simulations. These constraints function as a kind of gravitational force that drags on the realism of the simulation. The use of red-teaming injects a measure of contingency and nonlinearity into the simulation that is often lacking. Hence the importance of Roberta Sloan&#8217;s emphasis on improvisation while remaining within the overall framework of the scenario.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Also interesting is Bunker&#8217;s speculations on future terrorism and low-intensity challenges (much of which are familiar to those who have followed his writings over the last two decades) and his concrete definition of the Terrorist Attack Cycle. The book is targeted towards law-enforcement, but the principles are scalable to any DOD group concerned with counterterrorrism. Perhaps most interesting for the reader is Sloan and Bunker&#8217;s writings about the &#8220;emotional divide&#8217; involved in mirror-image training. Truly &#8220;becoming the enemy&#8221; is a draining and often emotionally challenging process. Sloan and Bunker write about the necessity for immersion, but also stress that while the unorthodox often make the best red-team members, they also must be credible and posses useful skills. The book is mainly targeted towards the tactical level&#8211;which is suitable for its intended audience&#8211;although there is some operational-level coverage. Given that the complexity of such simulations dwarfs the need for most law enforcement, such a focus is appropriate.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Red-teaming is uniquely suited to CT challenges. While red-teaming is a useful tool in all forms of conflict, terrorists operate from worldviews and combat frameworks that are largely foreign to the professional soldier or police officer. Bunker and Sloan&#8217;s book skillfully updates <em>Simulating Terrorism</em> for a new era.</p>
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		<title>Red Teaming and Policy</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2011/06/red-teaming-and-policy/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2011/06/red-teaming-and-policy/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 17 Jun 2011 17:09:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Red Teaming Concepts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Red Team Toolkit]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[red teaming]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2682</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Red teaming, by its very nature, can be antagonistic to policy. The purpose of a red team is to challenge official TTPs, plans, and estimates. So it is no surprise that a red team report by Jeremy Bordin on the growing distrust between Afghan soldiers and NATO is causing such a stirrup. The killings of [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Red teaming, by its very nature, can be antagonistic to policy. The purpose of a red team is to challenge official TTPs, plans, and estimates. So it is no surprise that a <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303499204576389763385348524.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hps_MIDDLETopNews">red team report</a> by Jeremy Bordin on the growing distrust between Afghan soldiers and NATO is causing such a stirrup. </p>
<blockquote><p>The killings of American soldiers by Afghan troops are turning into a &#8220;rapidly growing systemic threat&#8221; that could undermine the entire war effort, according to a classified military study.The study by Jeffrey Bordin, a political and behavioral scientist working for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, warns that the magnitude of the killings &#8220;may be unprecedented between &#8216;allies&#8217; in modern history.&#8221; Based on interviews with some 600 Afghan troops, the report concludes that there is a dangerous &#8220;crisis of trust&#8221; between Afghan forces and American soldiers that is being ignored by top commanders. &#8230;Mr. Bordin and other similar researchers, part of a so-called Red Team within the military, are tasked with finding weaknesses and shortcomings that the enemy may exploit.</p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Red teaming is not a search for a worst-case scenario, but rather a look at the role of assumptions. Some assumptions can prove to be valid if accurately defended. Others are not.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; One red team study I&#8217;d like to see on Afghanistan would be on the feasibility of the emerging &#8220;Biden-plus&#8221; consensus. While the flaws of the current policy have been detailed, I have yet to see a substantial look at the assumptions of the lighter footprint model.</p>
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		<title>COGnitive Dissonance</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/09/cognitive-dissonance/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/09/cognitive-dissonance/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 05 Sep 2010 21:40:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Red Teaming Concepts]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2521</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There&#8217;s a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly on the perennial issue of the American interpretation of Clausewitz&#8217;s Center of Gravity (COG). The article makes the point that the definition of the COG in Joint Publication 5-0 (as well as the general American interpretation of the COG) is incoherent and proposes a new operational definition: [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There&#8217;s a <a href="http://www.ndu.edu/press/redefining-center-of-gravity.html">new article</a> in <em>Joint Forces Quarterly</em> on the perennial issue of the American interpretation of Clausewitz&#8217;s Center of Gravity (COG). The article makes the point that the definition of the COG in Joint Publication 5-0 (as well as the general American interpretation of the COG) is incoherent and proposes a new operational definition: &#8220;The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.&#8221; The author also argues that a slavish devotion to the COG definition originally laid down by Carl von Clausewitz is inappropriate. <span id="more-2521"></span><br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There are two separate issues here. First, although <em>On War</em> is the most transcendent work of military theory ever published, even some of the most ardent Clausewitzians do not <a href="http://www.clausewitz.com/Complex/Proposax.htm">treat the work</a> as the Bible or the Quran. So if a concept is no longer useful we should abandon it&#8211;Clausewitz himself would understand. The problem is, however, that most of the American problems with the COG concept originated not from the way Clausewitz wrote the concept but how it was defined in American doctrine.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;I&#8217;ll quote from my <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/354-elkus.pdf">SWJ article</a> on the subject:<br />
<blockquote>The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) scholar Antulio Echevarria II, however, disagrees with the Paret interpretation. The Army analyst argues that the Paret translation, while the best available, gives the false impression that COG is a source of strength. He then suggests that Clausewitz’s own metaphor is drawn from classical physics’ concept of “the point where the forces of gravity can be said to converge within an object, the spot at which the object’s weight is balanced in all directions. Striking at or otherwise upsetting the center of gravity can cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall to the ground.” In Echevarria’s view, the center of gravity is neither a strength nor weakness. Echevarria explains that the COG is a point of connectivity—a state of unity or purpose from which the opponent comes together. As such, they can be directly attacked to upset the delicate balance. Echevarria argues that Clausewitz’s concept is derived primarily from the mechanical sciences and reflects a holistic and systemic view of the opponent.</p></blockquote>
<p>	&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This interpretation is remarkably different from how it is expressed in JP 5-0, where the COG &#8220;can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.&#8221; This, in turn, led to the concept of critical requirements and vulnerabilities, which is an American innovation as well. These are subtle but important differences. In the American conception, the COG is a source of strength that exists on every level of war. In the Clausewitzian concept, the COG is simply a point of connectivity that binds the opponent together. The Clausewitzian concept is, from a practical perspective, more useful. Why?<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;In James McPherson&#8217;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Tried-War-Abraham-Lincoln-Commander/dp/1594201919">retelling</a>, Abraham Lincoln&#8217;s strategic acumen lay in his recognition that the Confederate Army was the COG of the Southern war effort. His generals, on the other hand, were obsessed with maneuvering to gain control of the Southern capitol. Seen in this light, striking the COG had massive effect across the Southern system. This is what an real &#8220;effects-based operation&#8221; looks like. The Southern Army was neither either purely of strength or weakness, but it was what bound the Southern war effort together. There is nothing really complex about this&#8211;as Clausewitz tells us defeating the enemy&#8217;s fielded forces is a good idea. This is true either in a campaign of annihilation or erosion.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;The critical vulnerabilities and requirements, target value analysis, systems analysis, and campaign design frameworks may be useful in and of themselves in operational art for various purposes. But they have little to do with the Clausewitzian concept of the COG. If we want to use these frameworks we should justify them on their own merits. The COG as Clausewitz originally defined it is also an eminently practical framework. The author&#8217;s proposed redefinition also comes close to the Clausewitizian COG definition too. </p>
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		<title>Chuck Norris Tactics: The 70s-80s Revolution in Counterterrorism Tactics and Operations</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/07/chuck-norris-tactics-the-70s-80s-revolution-in-counterterrorism-tactics-and-operations/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/07/chuck-norris-tactics-the-70s-80s-revolution-in-counterterrorism-tactics-and-operations/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Jul 2010 23:05:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issues]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2446</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[As campy is it is (especially in light of Chuck Norris&#8217; general canon), the trailer linked above represents one of decision-makers&#8217; worst national security nightmares during the 1960s to the early 1980s: a hijacking and hostages scenario. What UCLA&#8217;s David Rapaport calls the &#8220;New Left Wave&#8221; of paramilitary terrorism featured a number of groups, ranging [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><object width="480" height="385"><param name="movie" value="http://www.youtube.com/v/0U0G9OT_yq4&amp;hl=en_US&amp;fs=1"></param><param name="allowFullScreen" value="true"></param><param name="allowscriptaccess" value="always"></param><embed src="http://www.youtube.com/v/0U0G9OT_yq4&amp;hl=en_US&amp;fs=1" type="application/x-shockwave-flash" allowscriptaccess="always" allowfullscreen="true" width="480" height="385"></embed></object> As campy is it is (especially in light of Chuck Norris&#8217; general canon), the trailer linked above represents one of decision-makers&#8217; worst national security nightmares during the 1960s to the early 1980s: a hijacking and hostages scenario. What UCLA&#8217;s David Rapaport <a href="http://www.anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm">calls the</a> &#8220;New Left Wave&#8221; of paramilitary terrorism featured a number of groups, ranging from highly competent state-supported terrorists with military training and tactical skill to disjointed student radicals playing Che with pipe bombs and poorly written &#8220;radical manifestos.&#8221; Many groups were somewhat in between. It is sometimes difficult to recognize it in today&#8217;s threat environment, but the state&#8217;s tactical and operational response to the New Left Wave&#8217;s tactical challenge is one of the great success stories in national security policy. <span id="more-2446"></span><br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;There were essentially three paramilitary terrorist tactical scenarios: the spree killing (like the 1972 Lod Airport Massacre), the high-profile ground hostage situation (the 1972 Munich games), and the airplane hijacking (which was merely an airborne variant of the ground hijacking). Unlike today&#8217;s terrorists, the New Left Wave (and some elements of Rapaport&#8217;s Anti-Colonial Wave) did not generally want to die and tended to disdain ostentatious displays of brutality. They were prepared to die, certainly, and also relied (like previous terrorists) on massacre and targeted killings. But their desire to be seen as legitimate (Yasir Arafat&#8217;s grandstanding in front of the UN being a prominent example) acted as something of a constraint. State backing also constrained them to a degree that al-Qaeda or other Salafist groups would never accept today.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;So the New Left terrorists aimed to use calculated amounts of force to create extended situations that would draw politicians into the &#8220;<a href="http://www.amazon.com/Terrorist-Trap-Americas-Experience-Terrorism/dp/0253214777">terrorist trap</a>,&#8221; a protracted and humiliating media-rich hostage situation that would allow them to extract policy concessions or gain more attention or legitimacy to their cause from international well-wishers. A well-played incident could also drive more recruits to their cause and demonstrate more viability to a state backer. For the more radical groups, a paramilitary massacre served the same function that the Mumbai incident did today in attempting to weaken the will of an adversary policymaker.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;From a tactical perspective, the aspiring terrorist trying to create a protracted situation must be able to use a combination of human shields (hostages), early warning (vigorous patrolling, watching the TV for clues of a police assault), fortification (various kinds of booby traps and barriers), firepower (infantry weaponry), deception/information operations, and trickery (outwitting the on-site incident commander, the negotiator, and their superiors) to prolong the situation as long as possible and exit to a friendly territory. The risks were high, as terrorists usually do not survive armed assaults by police or military special units. They are either all killed in the takeover or <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_embassy_hostage_crisis">summarily executed afterwards</a>. And if the terrorist survived the commando assault, he or she faced a lifetime in jail.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Terrorists were able to succeed because of the state&#8217;s tactical and operational deficits. On the tactical side, specialized police and military units that could handle a delicate and complex hostage situation were far and few between. What was more common was for line units to be employed in that role without specialized training. The results were usually bloody. Even successes like the end of the 1979 Mecca Takeover were far more gory than they had to be. Operationally, incident command as well as the linkage between the tactical employment of police and military on the ground and the national security decisionmaking at the top was faulty as well. To boot, passive security could have prevented many hijackings and hostage scenarios.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Airline hijackings presented an operational challenge of an entirely different magnitude. Because foreign flights had weaker security and a closer distance to &#8220;safe&#8221; territory, terrorists would commandeer a plane, land it and protract the situation, and then fly it to a Soviet-backed state once they had extracted value out of the tactical situation. Local police and military units usually were not up to the challenge of the situation. The &#8220;Entebbe&#8221; scenario was the worst of all, as Western forces would have to deploy directly into hostile territory to raid the plane. Nevertheless, airplane hijackings&#8211;with the exception of 9/11&#8211;were pretty much a thing of the past by the late 80s, and paramilitary attacks and hostage incidents as a whole disappeared from the developed world. Why?<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Passive security, such as better on-site security and international law enforcement cooperation helped dramatically raise the costs of hijacking and hostage incidents. Beginning in the 1970s, specialized law enforcement and military units also developed that were capable of handling complex hostage scenarios (for a complete account, see Tailon&#8217;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/gp/search?index=books&#038;linkCode=qs&#038;keywords=0275974685">monograph</a> on tactical units). These adaptive units were capable not only of domestic counterterrorist response but international deployment very far afield&#8211;which enabled them to handle incidents that locals could not.  Counterterrorism units also benefited from international cooperation in forward basing, on-site advice and collaboration, and a collaborative doctrinal and training environment that allowed American, German, Israeli, French, and other tactical pioneers to benefit from each others&#8217; bitter experiences. While Entebbe stands out as a &#8220;magic bullet&#8221; operation, a better example of a resolved tactical situation was the German GSG-9&#8242;s wildly successful 1977 Mogadishu operation against the Red Army Faction hijackers aboard Lufthansa Flight 181.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Operational incident command also improved, as agencies such as the FBI developed doctrine and TTPs for the overall visualization and command of hostage incidents. This is especially true in regards to forward-deployed counterterrorism missions. The logistical and planning inherent in the resolution of an Entebbe-type situation is nothing short of breathtaking, and it required near-perfect operational coordination to carry out. We shouldn&#8217;t go so far as to say that military and police forces have it down to a science, but it is indisputable that a doctrinal and functional evolution did occur. Today&#8217;s popular culture (the fanciful <em>Delta Force</em> as well as Tom Clancy&#8217;s <em>Rainbow Six</em> novels) reflects a public expectation of tactical and operational competence that audiences in the aftermath of the Munich Olympics disaster would have derided as pure fantasy.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;This tactical evolution, however, probably doesn&#8217;t extend beyond terrorist hostage incidents. The state&#8217;s advantage over terrorists is the ability to employ all of its power in a focused manner (police and military counterterrorism units) on a vastly weaker force in a way that negates the terrorists&#8217; asymmetric advantages. Although this is vastly more difficult in a foreign setting (Mogadishu) than domestically, a friendly host nation operating environment goes a long way towards making Mogadishu-like missions possible. Foreign missions against &#8220;rogue states&#8221; holding hostages still pose extremely difficult problems. The failures of Operation Eagle Claw (1980), the Son Tay Raid (1970), and the Mayaguez Incident (1975) are all instructive. For a good sense of these problems, CT Kamp&#8217;s <em>Air and Space Power Journal</em> <a href="http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html">article on Eagle Claw</a> is a must-read.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;A foreign hostage rescue operation in a denied environment against a hostile conventional state force involves the suppression of enemy conventional and irregular forces (land and air defenses), sterling intelligence, a strong (as per McRaven&#8217;s <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Spec-Ops-Studies-Operations-Practice/dp/0891416005">principles of special operations</a>) seizure of initial relative advantage from the enemy, high demands on training and rehearsals, sound joint operational command, extremely good deception and information operations, very painstaking logistical planning concerning entry and extraction, and cooperation with neighboring states. This is something of an oversimplification, but it would take a book to go through all of the complex factors in planning for this type of mission. The enemy&#8217;s ability to frustrate complex plans is also greatly improved, as are the potentials for the plan to break down over a single point of failure. Entebbe, was, in many respects, a fluke that is unlikely to be repeated again. Despite the immense advances in counterterrorism tactics and operations as well as the overall growth in special operations in the West, foreign hostage rescue operations in denied environments against rogue states are likely to remain the &#8220;final frontier&#8221; for operatives and planners. </p>
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		<title>Complexity and Continuity</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/02/complexit/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/02/complexit/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Feb 2010 09:59:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Red Teaming Concepts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[complexity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[theory]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2117</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[What&#8217;s new and what&#8217;s old? Debate over defense theory and practice has focused much in recent years about the novelty of respective defense theories and terminology. This debate, like the COIN debate, is probably going to continue to go around in circles. Is war more complex than it has been in the past? Probably not. [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>What&#8217;s new and what&#8217;s old? Debate over defense theory and practice has focused much in recent years about the <a href="http://www.afji.com/2009/11/4114043">novelty</a> of respective defense theories and terminology. This debate, like the <a href="http://rethinkingsecurity.typepad.com/rethinkingsecurity/2010/02/transformers-and-strategy.html">COIN debate</a>, is probably going to <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/09/theory-policy-and-strategy-a-c/">continue to go around</a> in circles. Is war more complex than it has been in the past? Probably not. So why do we feel like it is? <span id="more-2117"></span><br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;First, complexity is often a product of lived experience. A soldier serving in Allenby&#8217;s campaign in Palestine in World War I would take a different view of the complexity of his tasks than a soldier in the Western front, although both operational problems were equally complex (the considerations behind the infantry offensive and its coordination with artillery in the Western front were equally complex as the war of movement waged by Allenby in battles such as Megiddo in 1918). Second, complexity is often a product of structural factors. If you have a poor strategy and you are trying to design a campaign plan, things will by definition look scary and complex because the intent you seek to realize is hazy and ambiguous. Poor training or a <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/08/complexity-defense-policy-and/">very mechanistic education</a> in strategy can also make problems look complex when <a href="http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/01/sorry-pentathlete-wasnt-on-the/">methods only appropriate for one kind of situation</a> fall through.<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;One thing that can probably help us is to look back at complex and intractable problems in strategy of the past often forgotten in our field of study&#8217;s presentism. The Cold War, for example, was really complex&#8211;as any look at the mathematics of deterrence theory and game theory indicates. The <a href="http://press.princeton.edu/titles/8980.html">cognitive challenge</a> of adapting to French superiority of a new method of war in the early 1800s was also a difficult task for Prussia. The Civil War and the American Revolution are also great case studies because of the way they exposed one of the fundamental weaknesses of American strategy&#8211;divided government and the conflict between the decentralized democracy the founders preferred and the centralized command necessary to integrate political and military effects in war. </p>
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		<title>The DSB Calls for More Red Teaming</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/02/the-dsb-calls-for-more-red-teaming/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2010/02/the-dsb-calls-for-more-red-teaming/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Feb 2010 18:05:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Editor</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Red Teaming Concepts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DSB 2008 Summer Study]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DSB Report on Capability Surprise]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[red teaming]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surprise]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=2107</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[In the recently published Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, the Pentagon&#8217;s Defense Science Board (DSB) notes the following among its recommendations: Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception. Secretary of Defense direct the use of red teaming throughout DOD by developing and employing best practice guides, [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the recently published <em><a href="http://www.carlisle.army.mil/DIME/documents/2009-09%20Capability%20Surprise%20Report%20DSB.pdf">Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise</a></em>, the Pentagon&#8217;s Defense Science Board (DSB) notes the following among its recommendations:</p>
<blockquote><p>Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception. Secretary of Defense direct the use of red teaming throughout DOD by developing and employing best practice guides, intellectual focus in professional military education, and more aggressive use of red teams in exercises. The Secretary should also lead by example and establish a strategic-level red team to challenge and inform national security and top level defense policies and strategies.<sup><a href="http://redteamjournal.com/2010/02/the-dsb-calls-for-more-red-teaming/#footnote_0_2107" id="identifier_0_2107" class="footnote-link footnote-identifier-link" title="This text is drawn from the co-chairs&amp;#8217; submission letter at the start of the report.">1</a></sup></p></blockquote>
<p>We, of course, agree with this recommendation and have offered similar recommendations in the past, including <a href="http://redteamjournal.com/2008/11/a-call-for-a-red-teaming-surge/">this</a> 2008 call for a red teaming &#8220;surge.&#8221;</p>
<h3>Notes:</h3><ol class="footnotes"><li id="footnote_0_2107" class="footnote">This text is drawn from the co-chairs&#8217; submission letter at the start of the report.</li></ol>]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Trying to Find a Paradigm Shift</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/10/trying-to-find-a-paradigm-shift/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/10/trying-to-find-a-paradigm-shift/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2009 00:40:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[future war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lebanon war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1949</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The American Enterprise Institute&#8217;s Michael Auslin has an interesting post about technology and paradigm shifts. It is quite pessimistic: &#8220;There is much discussion of asymmetric weapons systems, disruptive technologies, and new warfighting frontiers. Concerns over anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, cyber warfare, and electro-magnetic pulse are getting increasing attention by military thinkers. Yet, it [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The American Enterprise Institute&#8217;s Michael Auslin has an interesting <a href="http://www.defensestudies.org/?p=548">post</a> about technology and paradigm shifts. It is quite pessimistic: </p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;There is much discussion of asymmetric weapons systems, disruptive technologies, and new warfighting frontiers.  Concerns over anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic cruise missiles, cyber warfare, and electro-magnetic pulse are getting increasing attention by military thinkers.  Yet, it is hard to avoid the sense that technology is outstripping our ability to conceptualize not merely tactical response but even strategic calculations.  Our network-linked force is more lethal than ever before, but that in turn now makes it possibly among the most vulnerable.  Are our warfighters, and their supporting circles, truly prepared for a conflict that might obviate the vast and crucial advantages the U.S. military now possesses over any other force on earth? &#8220;</p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Perhaps the biggest barrier to conceptualizing  technological and tactical shifts is the lack of experience against a comparable conventional combatant. The first and second Gulf Wars, while no picnics, did not feature a truly comparable adversary. Since Auslin makes a metaphor to the technological and tactical changes that prefigured World War I, it is important to point out that with the important exception of the Franco-Prussian War, most of the European powers that fought in the conflict spent the decades beforehand in colonial warfare. While some colonial conflicts (most notably the Boer war) prefigured changes in world conflict, beating down the Sudanese mahdi did not necessarily provide the British with proper preparation for engaging the Germans. While the Iraq and Afghanistan wars have provided plenty of valuable lessons, there is a reason why the Pentagon is focusing so intently on a war that it <em>didn&#8217;t</em> fight&#8211;the 2006 Lebanon war. However, even this might not be much of a guide to how a future opponent might fight a positional war. There is a danger of tactics being drawn up as an &#8220;ideal type&#8221; that does not correspond to the direction of future conflict. </p>
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		<title>Complexity and Victory</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/09/complexity-and-victory/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/09/complexity-and-victory/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Sun, 06 Sep 2009 06:40:53 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[theory]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[victory]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1917</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Patrick Porter argues against what he views as a &#8220;glib&#8221; point made by many pundits that the idea of victory has no place in today&#8217;s supposedly more complex conflicts: &#8220;Victory has not gone away any more than defeat has. Victory is the securing of desired, or desirable political outcomes from a conflict. It will change [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Patrick Porter <a href="http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/09/05/non-reasons-for-failure/">argues against</a> what he views as a &#8220;glib&#8221; point made by many pundits that the idea of victory has no place in today&#8217;s supposedly more complex conflicts: </p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Victory has not gone away any more than defeat has. Victory is the securing of desired, or desirable political outcomes from a conflict. It will change its face and its character according to context. Sometimes it will look like parades, formal surrenders and declarations, sometimes it will be a more diffuse and unspectacular process of handing self-government over to an ally whose state one has helped build. The process of translating military breakthroughs into long-term political gains has never been straightforward and has often threatened to break down. While it is possibly harder to achieve in extremely difficult wars of armed nation-building, that doesn’t mean the concept itself has no coherence.&#8221; </p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Porter has hit the nail on the head. Victory has rarely been decisive or lasting in any form of warfare, hence Clausewit&#8217;z dictum that &#8220;in war the result is never final.&#8221; But this very simple idea is incredibly difficult for many to accept. The profound murkiness of conflicts like Afghanistan and Iraq is putting this basic truth into sharper view. </p>
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		<title>Getting Underneath</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/08/getting-underneath/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/08/getting-underneath/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Aug 2009 17:01:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Adam Elkus</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Current Issues]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ethnographic research]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1894</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Mike Innes of CTLab flags an ongoing trend in conflict studies: &#8220;Somewhere between the relational turn in social science and increasingly granular approaches to warfighting, the reality of international relations, and accounts of the wars being fought from core to periphery, have been looking more and more like exercises in hacking deep ecology. In The [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mike Innes of CTLab <a href="http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2009/8/8/hacking-the-deep-ecology-of-war.html">flags an</a> ongoing <a href="http://www.terraplexic.org/review/2009/8/8/hacking-the-deep-ecology-of-war.html">trend</a> in conflict studies: </p>
<blockquote><p>&#8220;Somewhere between the relational turn in social science and increasingly granular approaches to warfighting, the reality of international relations, and accounts of the wars being fought from core to periphery, have been looking more and more like exercises in hacking deep ecology. In <em>The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One</em>, David Kilcullen leverages &#8216;conflict ethnography&#8217; to help explain insurgencies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.<em> In Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival In the Siege of Sarajevo</em>, Peter Andreas fine tunes international political economy through a close reading of the lives of the city&#8217;s residents. Similarly, in<em> Shadows of War: Violence, Power, and International Profiteering In the Twenty-First Century</em>, Carolyn Nordstrom digs into the &#8216;deep politics of war&#8217;. ..What&#8217;s interesting about this &#8211; not what&#8217;s new, which isn&#8217;t what I&#8217;m suggesting, but what makes this more engaging and accessible &#8211; is that there&#8217;s a deep ecology of virtual violence, ambient warfare, and fluid interfaces, and no single discipline has a lock on how best to decipher and map out its surfaces to get at the underneath of things.&#8221; </p></blockquote>
<p>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Innes further notes that the &#8220;The point not made is that digging at the details, getting to the story beneath the story, means looking to the event beneath the event &#8211; to that spot beneath the epicentre that actually constitutes ground zero: the hypocenter.&#8221; Ethnographic research is perhaps more appropriate than political science given the vastly smaller scale of today&#8217;s conflicts. Local knowledge is always important in war, but these conflicts place a high premium on detailed multidisciplinary study of the &#8220;deep ecology&#8221; Innes refers to. The more granular one can go, the better. On the red-team side, more granular information produces a better understanding of the dynamics of &#8220;small war&#8221;&#8211;and thus could be grist for more accurate wargames, simulations, and training. An ecological approach to conflict also remedies another deficit&#8211;the fact that debate over insurgency and terrorism rarely if ever addresses noncombatants as anything more than passive victims or a feature of the landscape (the human terrain) that must be factored into overall analysis. </p>
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		<title>Weekday Reading</title>
		<link>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/08/weekday-reading/</link>
		<comments>http://redteamjournal.com/2009/08/weekday-reading/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 05 Aug 2009 14:45:40 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Mark Mateski</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Articles of interest]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Billion Dollar Lessons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chunka Mui]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[devil's advocate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Paul Carroll]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://redteamjournal.com/?p=1852</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If you&#8217;ve always wondered how red teaming might apply to business problems, try Carroll and Mui&#8217;s 2008 bestseller Billion Dollar Lessons. In it, the authors define a set of common business strategies and discuss how failure often results. In each case, they identify the questions decision makers could have asked that might have helped them [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>If you&#8217;ve always wondered how red teaming might apply to business problems, try Carroll and Mui&#8217;s 2008 bestseller <em>Billion Dollar Lessons</em>. In it, the authors define a set of common business strategies and discuss how failure often results. In each case, they identify the questions decision makers could have asked that might have helped them avoid failure. They close by arguing for better <em>devil&#8217;s advocacy</em>. The issues differ from those that many red teamers typically consider, but the framework is sound, and the principles can easily be ported to other domains. Among other things, Carroll and Mui&#8217;s approach suggests that red teaming is not limited to military or security problems.</p>
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