by Adam Elkus on September 5, 2010
There’s a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly on the perennial issue of the American interpretation of Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity (COG). The article makes the point that the definition of the COG in Joint Publication 5-0 (as well as the general American interpretation of the COG) is incoherent and proposes a new operational definition: “The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.” The author also argues that a slavish devotion to the COG definition originally laid down by Carl von Clausewitz is inappropriate.
There are two separate issues here. First, although On War is the most transcendent work of military theory ever published, even some of the most ardent Clausewitzians do not treat the work as the Bible or the Quran. So if a concept is no longer useful we should abandon it–Clausewitz himself would understand. The problem is, however, that most of the American problems with the COG concept originated not from the way Clausewitz wrote the concept but how it was defined in American doctrine.
I’ll quote from my SWJ article on the subject:
The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) scholar Antulio Echevarria II, however, disagrees with the Paret interpretation. The Army analyst argues that the Paret translation, while the best available, gives the false impression that COG is a source of strength. He then suggests that Clausewitz’s own metaphor is drawn from classical physics’ concept of “the point where the forces of gravity can be said to converge within an object, the spot at which the object’s weight is balanced in all directions. Striking at or otherwise upsetting the center of gravity can cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall to the ground.” In Echevarria’s view, the center of gravity is neither a strength nor weakness. Echevarria explains that the COG is a point of connectivity—a state of unity or purpose from which the opponent comes together. As such, they can be directly attacked to upset the delicate balance. Echevarria argues that Clausewitz’s concept is derived primarily from the mechanical sciences and reflects a holistic and systemic view of the opponent.
This interpretation is remarkably different from how it is expressed in JP 5-0, where the COG “can be viewed as the set of characteristics, capabilities, and sources of power from which a system derives its moral or physical strength, freedom of action, and will to act.” This, in turn, led to the concept of critical requirements and vulnerabilities, which is an American innovation as well. These are subtle but important differences. In the American conception, the COG is a source of strength that exists on every level of war. In the Clausewitzian concept, the COG is simply a point of connectivity that binds the opponent together. The Clausewitzian concept is, from a practical perspective, more useful. Why?
In James McPherson’s retelling, Abraham Lincoln’s strategic acumen lay in his recognition that the Confederate Army was the COG of the Southern war effort. His generals, on the other hand, were obsessed with maneuvering to gain control of the Southern capitol. Seen in this light, striking the COG had massive effect across the Southern system. This is what an real “effects-based operation” looks like. The Southern Army was neither either purely of strength or weakness, but it was what bound the Southern war effort together. There is nothing really complex about this–as Clausewitz tells us defeating the enemy’s fielded forces is a good idea. This is true either in a campaign of annihilation or erosion.
The critical vulnerabilities and requirements, target value analysis, systems analysis, and campaign design frameworks may be useful in and of themselves in operational art for various purposes. But they have little to do with the Clausewitzian concept of the COG. If we want to use these frameworks we should justify them on their own merits. The COG as Clausewitz originally defined it is also an eminently practical framework. The author’s proposed redefinition also comes close to the Clausewitizian COG definition too.
by Editor on July 27, 2010
We are pleased to launch the Red Team Journal occasional paper series with an article by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus titled “Adaptive Red Teaming: Protecting Across the Spectrum.” In the article, John and Adam propose three methods of improving analytical red teaming and discuss each in turn. Additional papers in the series will follow in the coming months.
by Raymond Parks on July 23, 2010
Cross-domain red teaming, also called multidimensional or full spectrum red teaming portrays real adversaries better than single-domain red teaming. Cross domain doesn’t refer to Microsoft domains or multilevel security domains. We’re talking about how attacks by real adversaries take advantage of three major security domains–cyber, physical, and human–to attack systems. Small digression–here at Sandia, we define systems as a combination of people, processes, and technologies–not as a computer system alone. Thus, cross-domain red teaming attacks systems through the people, their processes, and the technology (cyber or physical) to achieve the effect that the portrayed adversary would want. [click to continue ...]
by Adam Elkus on July 22, 2010
It is a tenet of modern strategic theory and practice that globalization has made local problems international. An ethnic revolt, tyrannical dictator, environmental disaster, or criminal gang’s operations in a distant land can have repercussions in Miami, Los Angeles, or New York. The problem is that these analyses start by stating a threat and then proceed to strategies for dealing with them. Rather, we ought to begin to think about our policy. [click to continue ...]
by Mark Mateski on April 8, 2010
The intangible qualities that characterize a good red team can be difficult to measure but are arguably just as critical to success as a team’s technical proficiency. In fact, a technically proficient but arrogant red team may actually be less useful than a less proficient but more humble and adaptable one. After all, the less proficient but adaptable team can always contract the expertise it needs, particularly if it is first willing to consider and ask the right questions. [click to continue ...]
by Mark Mateski on March 16, 2010
Let’s pretend that I’m a stubborn, arrogant decision maker. My stakeholders are pressuring me to red team my current plan. The last thing I want is a red team nosing around in my business, so I decide to list the reasons why I think it’s a bad idea. (Of course, this list is just for me; I would never share it with the stakeholders.) Here’s what I’ve come up with so far: [click to continue ...]
by Mark Mateski on March 4, 2010
Red teaming remains stuck in the Wild West phase of its maturity. One of the main culprits is the lack of shared terms—a lack that makes it difficult for red teamers to compare methods, communicate insights, and, ultimately, build a consistent and structured discipline. IEEE 1471 can help. [click to continue ...]
by Adam Elkus on February 9, 2010
What’s new and what’s old? Debate over defense theory and practice has focused much in recent years about the novelty of respective defense theories and terminology. This debate, like the COIN debate, is probably going to continue to go around in circles. Is war more complex than it has been in the past? Probably not. So why do we feel like it is? [click to continue ...]
by Editor on February 1, 2010
In the recently published Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board (DSB) notes the following among its recommendations:
Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception. Secretary of Defense direct the use of red teaming throughout DOD by developing and employing best practice guides, intellectual focus in professional military education, and more aggressive use of red teams in exercises. The Secretary should also lead by example and establish a strategic-level red team to challenge and inform national security and top level defense policies and strategies.
We, of course, agree with this recommendation and have offered similar recommendations in the past, including this 2008 call for a red teaming “surge.”
Notes:
by Mark Mateski on January 14, 2010
Awareness that traditional methods of assessing the risk of adversary attack are inadequate seems to be growing. One example is this SRA press release from last month referring to Parnell, Smith, and Moxley’s work. Another example is this DHS announcement. [click to continue ...]
