Having spent a previous entry extolling simple explanations, I will now indulge hypocritically (and gleefully) in a somewhat complex idea–rooted in on one of my favorite books. Charles Kurzman wrote Unthinkable Revolution in Iran to explain a basic incongruity: why did the Shah look so strong to observers when the fundamentals of his regime appeared–in retrospect–to be so weak? One could observe the same of Egypt, which–while burdened by numerous political and economic issues–did not appear to be on the verge of imminent collapse. Such events inevitably blindside governments–and by no fault of their own. [click to continue ...]
From the category archives:
Red Teaming Concepts
A guiding assumption of strategic writing since the late Cold War era is that strategy is getting more complex. Enough ink has been spilled on the debate over whether today’s world is more or less complex that I can hardly add anything new to the discussion. But it may be that complexity requires greater simplicity. [click to continue ...]
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Red teaming, by its very nature, can be antagonistic to policy. The purpose of a red team is to challenge official TTPs, plans, and estimates. So it is no surprise that a red team report by Jeremy Bordin on the growing distrust between Afghan soldiers and NATO is causing such a stirrup.
The killings of American soldiers by Afghan troops are turning into a “rapidly growing systemic threat” that could undermine the entire war effort, according to a classified military study.The study by Jeffrey Bordin, a political and behavioral scientist working for the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, warns that the magnitude of the killings “may be unprecedented between ‘allies’ in modern history.” Based on interviews with some 600 Afghan troops, the report concludes that there is a dangerous “crisis of trust” between Afghan forces and American soldiers that is being ignored by top commanders. …Mr. Bordin and other similar researchers, part of a so-called Red Team within the military, are tasked with finding weaknesses and shortcomings that the enemy may exploit.
Red teaming is not a search for a worst-case scenario, but rather a look at the role of assumptions. Some assumptions can prove to be valid if accurately defended. Others are not.
One red team study I’d like to see on Afghanistan would be on the feasibility of the emerging “Biden-plus” consensus. While the flaws of the current policy have been detailed, I have yet to see a substantial look at the assumptions of the lighter footprint model.
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Highlighting contingency lies at the center of red teaming theory and practice. Differing forms of red teaming ranging from a classic tactical red cell penetration exercise to alternative geosocial futures emphasize not only flaws in assumptions but possible tactical, operational, and strategic alternatives that arise from the fundamental nonlinearity of conflict. It is important to emphasize that this nonlinearity is not necessarily a new problem: Clausewitz addressed it (although in language limited by the science of his time) nearly two hundred years ago. Despite a popular bias towards ideas such as the concept of the “right side of history,” academic historians have also long been aware of the less than orderly movement of human events. [click to continue ...]
In the second Red Team Journal occasional paper, “Red Team Reign,” GEN Carter Ham, COL (Ret.) Greg Fontenot, LTC David Pendall, and Mr. Larry Closter advocate the use of red teaming in support of joint task force decision processes. The authors provide first-hand insight into how the practice of red teaming has evolved in recent years and offer a variety of useful observations, insights, and recommendations.
RTJ readers have been pretty quiet lately. I’d like to spur some discussion by intentionally posing a controversial argument:
- On a tactical level–where choices have direct consequences, and real learning sometimes does occur–red teaming can make a difference.
- On a strategic level–where policy is charted and events are saturated in political opportunism–red teaming is worthless.
There’s a new article in Joint Forces Quarterly on the perennial issue of the American interpretation of Clausewitz’s Center of Gravity (COG). The article makes the point that the definition of the COG in Joint Publication 5-0 (as well as the general American interpretation of the COG) is incoherent and proposes a new operational definition: “The center of gravity is the primary entity that possesses the inherent capability to achieve the objective.” The author also argues that a slavish devotion to the COG definition originally laid down by Carl von Clausewitz is inappropriate. [click to continue ...]
We are pleased to launch the Red Team Journal occasional paper series with an article by John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus titled “Adaptive Red Teaming: Protecting Across the Spectrum.” In the article, John and Adam propose three methods of improving analytical red teaming and discuss each in turn. Additional papers in the series will follow in the coming months.
Cross-domain red teaming, also called multidimensional or full spectrum red teaming portrays real adversaries better than single-domain red teaming. Cross domain doesn’t refer to Microsoft domains or multilevel security domains. We’re talking about how attacks by real adversaries take advantage of three major security domains–cyber, physical, and human–to attack systems. Small digression–here at Sandia, we define systems as a combination of people, processes, and technologies–not as a computer system alone. Thus, cross-domain red teaming attacks systems through the people, their processes, and the technology (cyber or physical) to achieve the effect that the portrayed adversary would want. [click to continue ...]
It is a tenet of modern strategic theory and practice that globalization has made local problems international. An ethnic revolt, tyrannical dictator, environmental disaster, or criminal gang’s operations in a distant land can have repercussions in Miami, Los Angeles, or New York. The problem is that these analyses start by stating a threat and then proceed to strategies for dealing with them. Rather, we ought to begin to think about our policy. [click to continue ...]
