The intangible qualities that characterize a good red team can be difficult to measure but are arguably just as critical to success as a team’s technical proficiency. In fact, a technically proficient but arrogant red team may actually be less useful than a less proficient but more humble and adaptable one. After all, the less proficient but adaptable team can always contract the expertise it needs, particularly if it is first willing to consider and ask the right questions. [click to continue ...]
From the category archives:
Red Teaming Concepts
Let’s pretend that I’m a stubborn, arrogant decision maker. My stakeholders are pressuring me to red team my current plan. The last thing I want is a red team nosing around in my business, so I decide to list the reasons why I think it’s a bad idea. (Of course, this list is just for me; I would never share it with the stakeholders.) Here’s what I’ve come up with so far: [click to continue ...]
Red teaming remains stuck in the Wild West phase of its maturity. One of the main culprits is the lack of shared terms—a lack that makes it difficult for red teamers to compare methods, communicate insights, and, ultimately, build a consistent and structured discipline. IEEE 1471 can help. [click to continue ...]
What’s new and what’s old? Debate over defense theory and practice has focused much in recent years about the novelty of respective defense theories and terminology. This debate, like the COIN debate, is probably going to continue to go around in circles. Is war more complex than it has been in the past? Probably not. So why do we feel like it is? [click to continue ...]
In the recently published Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise, the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board (DSB) notes the following among its recommendations:
Red teaming as the norm instead of the exception. Secretary of Defense direct the use of red teaming throughout DOD by developing and employing best practice guides, intellectual focus in professional military education, and more aggressive use of red teams in exercises. The Secretary should also lead by example and establish a strategic-level red team to challenge and inform national security and top level defense policies and strategies.1
We, of course, agree with this recommendation and have offered similar recommendations in the past, including this 2008 call for a red teaming “surge.”
Notes:
- This text is drawn from the co-chairs’ submission letter at the start of the report. [↩]
Awareness that traditional methods of assessing the risk of adversary attack are inadequate seems to be growing. One example is this SRA press release from last month referring to Parnell, Smith, and Moxley’s work. Another example is this DHS announcement. [click to continue ...]
All in all, the 2000s were a banner decade for strategic theory. Much of it was new or relatively new theories such as Hybrid Warfare, Fourth Generation Warfare, or Netwar. As the hipster Clausewitz (h/t Deichmans) image hints, some of it was old as well. Counterinsurgency came back in style too. Of course, the impetus for this strategic debate was the worst terrorist attack in American history–and nine years of what many now call the “Long War.” As 2010 emerges, here’s five new year’s resolutions (arbitrary number, I know) for strategic theory. Unlike your rather fantastic pledge to actually run a marathon this year, these pledges matter. [click to continue ...]
We are pleased to post the first in a series of articles by Michael J. Skroch of Sandia Labs on the modeling and simulation of red teaming. Michael is a founding member of the red teaming community and is well known within the community as a proponent of better red teaming methods and practices. He has written this article specifically for Red Team Journal and its readers. We believe the article is likely to become a standard reference in the field. You may download it as a PDF here.
This article builds on an historical operational problem first set by Liddell Hart in the interwar years. In this article, we will look at a new variation of this problem called net-fighter vs. net-fighter. As well, we introduce the concept of interposing tactics. The analysis will also contextualize interposing and 3D tactics. [click to continue ...]
In the past few months, I’ve posted a couple of items here about a new red teaming approach I’ve developed called “reciprocal net assessment” (RNA). This new RNA presentation stops short of describing the method in detail, but it does describe the need for the approach and a bit about the concepts behind it. If you have any questions or would like to learn more, you can contact me through Alternative Analysis.
