by Adam Elkus on September 15, 2009
I’m a bit late to comment on this, but Starbuck of Wings over Iraq has a great post on the use of Operational Design principles to conceptualize the Afghan campaign. Through problem-framing, one can conceptualize the problem to be solved through planning-a process that occurs intuitively but is brought to the fore by the specific planning methodology developed by TRADOC. However, one of the more interesting things about Starbuck’s op-ed is that he is applying the TRADOC methodology–meant for campaign planning as well as echelons below–to strategic questions:
Any ‘solution’ to the Afghanistan problem must be well-thought out, and operational design gives us a framework for examining problems of this nature. I’d like to invite everyone to not only debate the merits of further involvement in Afghanistan, but also to participate in the Army’s new operational design framework as a process for solving problems as complex as the ones we will face in small wars.
The verbiage he quotes from the Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Designall relate to strategic concerns. Questions such as “are national interests and ideals at stake?” are by definition questions of foreign policy. As Milan Vego noted in his critique, operational design “builds an artificial bridge to the strategic level.” Grounding in strategic concerns, however, is not necessarily a weakness. The operational level implements strategic objectives, and “campaign design,” by definition, must be rooted in a solid understanding of strategic questions even if strategic decisions have already been made by civilian policymakers. As Starbuck argues, however, the “design” framework can be used in framing strategic problems as well.
by Mark Mateski on September 9, 2009
Over the weekend, I finally read Eric Frank Russell’s 1957 science fiction novel Wasp, which, incidentally, appears on the RTJ book list. It’s an easy, entertaining read featuring the cunning off-world exploits of Earth agent James Mowry.
Realizing that they can’t win a war of attrition against the numerically superior forces of the Sirian Combine, Earth strategists plant lone agents on Sirian planets. The agents’ shared mission is to sow fear, incite discontent, and cause the Sirians to dissipate their strength behind their own lines.
In his attempt to achieve spectacular non-linear effects, Mowry is spectacularly lucky and spectacularly effective. It is the Holy Grail of every new generation of strategists, and Mowry lives it.
Rather than address Wasp as an analogy for this or that case, I want to consider the goal of achieving non-linear effects consistently. Does it work in the real world? Sometimes it does, certainly, but for all the papers and presentations trumpeting the advantages of non-linear strategies, my sense is that consistent success remains elusive. This is despite the fact that current U.S. strategists and leaders have been raised on complexity, systems perspectives, RMA, transformation, and effects-based operations.
I would guess that for every thousand strategists who read Sun Tzu, fewer than a hundred can implement the principles effectively and consistently outside of the classroom. Why? Good strategy is never a checklist exercise. Context counts, and it changes. Even the best strategist is susceptible to biases. Incomplete information, deception, the fog of war–the list of challenges is long and daunting. It’s no wonder that the kind of success James Mowry achieves in Wasp reads like fiction; after all, that’s exactly what it is.
So, what’s the answer? What can we do that we’re not doing already to generate better real-world strategies?
by Mark Mateski on August 10, 2009
In his book Design Paradigms, Henry Petroski highlights the concept of “proactive failure analysis.” He cites Christopher Alexander (the father of design patterns), who notes that
We are never capable of stating a design problem except in terms of the errors we have observed in past solutions to past problems. Even if we try to design something for an entirely new purpose that has never been conceived before, the best we can do in stating the problem is to anticipate how it might possibly go wrong by scanning mentally all the ways in which other things have gone wrong in the past.
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Notes:
by Mark Mateski on July 29, 2009
Many barriers to good decisions exist. Sometimes the barrier’s an inherent, individual bias; sometimes it’s a group pathology; sometimes it’s the complexity of the situation or the subtlety of the opponent’s deception plan; and sometimes it’s a combination of many factors. Regardless, it appears to be relatively easy to identify the factors that lead to poor decisions. Cognitive scientists, psychologists, and intelligence analysts are all familiar with the canonical lists of these biases and factors. Less common are lists of factors that contribute to good decisions. Is it simply because we can characterize these latter factors as simply the lack of the former, or is there something more that contributes to success? If so, what are the factors that characterize successful decisions? Similarly, what factors characterize successful red teaming?
by Adam Elkus on July 23, 2009
To add to Tim’s excellent rundown of failures in red teaming, another pressing issue is the fact that red teaming that demonstrates weaknesses in operational and strategic concepts is not always accepted by policy-makers. Lt. Gen Paul Van Riper’s performance during the Millennium Challenge 2002 exercises is often cited as a paramount example of red teaming results being ignored by policymakers. Riper used asymmetric tactics to stymie a numerically superior force equipped with top of the line command and control systems, thus demonstrating the weaknesses of many of the military concepts that come to prominence during the late 90′s and early 2000s.
Central to Brigadier General H.R. McMaster’s Vietnam-era civil-military study Dereliction of Duty (as well as many critical military histories of Vietnam) are the SIGMA series wagames, which predicted numerous problems in the Johnson administration’s Vietnam strategy. In one 1963 game, the end result was 500,000 troops deployed to the country and draft riots at home. Other games suggested that strategic bombing and the deployment of large-scale forces in the South would not compel North Vietnam to back down. Furthermore, participants noted that while BLUE Force had an overwhelmingly short-run and tactical focus while RED focused on long term and strategic objectives–putting less stock in short-term tactical victories.
What both examples demonstrate is that the success or failure of red teaming exercises is dependent on the policy process. Much is dependent on how the lessons of the red team are received, interpreted, and integrated into tactical, operational, or strategic planning.
by Mark Mateski on July 15, 2009
In the past few months, I have built and refined an approach to analysis I have dubbed reciprocal net assessment (RNA). It is based on principles inherent in hypergame analysis and is designed to encourage analysts and decision makers to avoid decision breakdowns and create and exploit decision opportunities. Although I am still refining the approach, I now believe it is ready for testing. I am currently offering pro bono analysis of two cases: one military- or security-related and the other business-related. If you might be interested in submitting a case for consideration, read on. [click to continue ...]
by Chris Flaherty on July 12, 2009
The analysis tools used by security professionals to assess asymmetric threats (such as a terrorist vehicle bombing) in respect to mass events or gathering places in complex urban environments rate poorly. A rethink is needed. [click to continue ...]
by Tim Hsia on July 9, 2009
In the May 11, 2009 issue of The New Yorker, Malcolm Gladwell penned a fascinating study of what happens when underdogs break the rules. The article has relevance to red teaming as Gladwell examines the studies of political scientist Ivan Arreguín-Toft: [click to continue ...]
by Mark Mateski on June 26, 2009
I’ve added a 50-slide introduction to red teaming to the site. It addresses need, context, definitions, applications, and types. I view it as a “living” document; in other words, this is version 1.0, and I plan to update it periodically.
by Adam Elkus on June 24, 2009
